國際政治經濟學

出自亞太綜合安全，Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Security

International political economy (IPE) is an academic discipline within the social sciences that analyzes international relations in combination with political economy. As an interdisciplinary field it draws on many distinct academic schools, most notably political science and economics, but also sociology, history, and cultural studies. The academic boundaries of IPE are flexible, and along with acceptable epistemologies are the subject of robust debate. This debate is essentially framed by the discipline's status as a new and interdisciplinary field of study.

Michael Mastanduno指出，國際政治學者大約在1970年代初開始對經濟議題感到興趣，但是這樣的興趣卻使得研究經濟與安全之間的關係走向不同於傳統國際安全研究的另一條路。自此以後，國際政治經濟學（International Political Economy）和國際安全（International Security）成為兩個截然不同的領域。研究國際經濟如何影響國際政治的學者很少會把分析結果延伸到安全議題上，而專注在國際安全領域的學者也很少會引用國際政治經濟學的理論來分析其研究對象。這樣的分野不僅在冷戰結束之後繼續存在，而且深深地妨礙了經濟因素與傳統國際安全研究的進一步整合。以亞洲金融危機為例，國際經濟學者大多專注於探討危機發生的原因，特別是金融危機是否肇因於資本主義市場內部機制運作失衡；而政治學者則將關注焦點放在金融危機對國家的影響，特別是政府在面對金融危機時的處理能力。其實將經濟與安全劃分為完全不同的領域在相當程度上阻礙了國際政治學者與經濟學者進一步合作的機會。正如James Caporaso所言：將國際政治經濟學與國際安全劃為兩個單獨的研究領域是當今國際政治理論的一個重大錯誤。國際政治經濟學理論大師Gilpin也認為：雖然經濟與安全可以被視為兩個不同的政策領域，但在實際上要將二者截然劃分有其困難。以主權國家為基礎的國際政治與安全體系為國際經濟提供了穩定的運作環境，而經濟活動產生的利益與財富又進一步強化了國家的力量與國際政治的穩定。

Despite such disagreements, most scholars can concur that IPE is ultimately concerned with the ways in which political forces (states, institutions, individual actors, etc.) shape the systems through which economic interactions are expressed, and conversely the effects that economic interactions (including the power of collective markets and individuals acting both within and outside of) have upon political structures and outcomes.

IPE scholars are at the center of the debate and research surrounding globalization, both in the popular and academic spheres. Other topics that command substantial attention among IPE scholars are international trade (with particular attention to the politics surrounding trade deals, but also significant work examining the results of trade deals), development, the relationship between democracy and markets, international finance, global markets, multi-state cooperation in solving trans-border economic problems, and the structural balance of power between and among states and institutions. Unlike conventional international relations power is understood to be both economic and political, which are interrelated in a complex manner.

目錄 1 起源 2 相關理論 2.1 重商主義 2.1.1 重商主義興起背景及其假設 3 重商主義的發展背景與現況概述 3.1 重商主義的主張 3.2 對重商主義的批評 3.3 重商主義的國家發展政策 3.4 新重商主義 3.5 參考文獻 3.6 新重商主義的面具 3.7 國家經濟戰略 3.8 國家主義 3.8.1 國際政經整合潮流淡化國家角色 3.8.2 背景與爭議 3.8.3 民族主義的理論之爭 3.8.4 民族主義的歷史發展 3.8.5 國內民族主義 3.8.6 美國於2001年後的民族主義 3.8.7 民族主義與極端主義 3.9 依賴理論 3.9.1 基本流派 3.9.2 發展歷史 3.9.3 互賴理論的局限 3.9.4 爭議 3.9.5 註記 3.10 Dependency theory WIKI版 3.10.1 Basics 3.10.2 Spread of theory 3.10.3 Quantitative dependency theory and the globalization of the dependency argument 3.10.4 Implications 3.10.5 Criticism by Neo-liberal Economists 3.10.6 Towards a Neo-classical/Dependency Theory Synthesis? 3.10.7 Literature 3.10.8 See also 3.10.9 Links 3.11 列寧與帝國主義 3.12 馬克思主義政治經濟學 3.13 基本觀念 3.14 使用價值 3.15 勞動二重性 3.16 勞動對象 3.17 馬克思與古典經濟學 3.18 奧地利學派的觀點 3.19 當前發展 3.20 全球主義 3.21 世界體系理論 (World-systems theory WIKI版) 3.21.1 The world system perspective 3.21.2 Wallerstein's formulation of the world-system approach 3.21.3 Developments of Wallerstein's approach 3.21.4 New Developments of the World System Analysis 3.21.4.1 Abu Lughod's version 3.21.4.2 Other contributions 3.21.5 The question of cycles 3.21.6 Regaining a Schumpeterian perspective 3.21.7 Literature (Selection) 3.21.8 References 3.21.9 See also 3.21.10 External links 3.22 新區域主義 3.23 霸權穩定理論 3.24 權力平衡 3.25 權力平衡作為制衡政策 3.26 權力平衡作為客觀態勢 3.27 參考資料 3.28 Hegemonic Stability Theory WIKI版 3.28.1 Criticism 3.28.2 Newer variations of the theory 3.28.3 Is the U.S. still a hegemon? 3.28.4 References 3.28.5 External links 4 相關國際文書 5 著名的國政經學者 6 外部連結

[編輯] 起源

IPE emerged as a heterodox approach to international studies during the 1970s as the 1973 world oil crisis and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system alerted academics, particularly in the U.S., of the importance, contingency, and weakness of the economic foundations of the world order. IPE scholars asserted that earlier studies of international relations had placed excessive emphasis on law, politics, and diplomatic history. Similarly, neoclassical economics was accused of abstraction and being ahistorical. Drawing heavily on historical sociology and economic history, IPE proposed a fusion of economic and political analysis. In this sense, both Marxist and liberal IPE scholars protested against the reliance of Western social science on the territorial state as a unit of analysis, and stressed the international system.

[編輯] 相關理論

[編輯] 重商主義

重商主義（mercantilism）一詞並非由單一學者獨創之學說，亦非某一國家獨行之政策。而是經長期演變而成的籠統名稱。

重商主義是一種政治經濟體系，其中隱含著政府與企業間的特定關係。重商主義不只是一種理論學說，而是一套經濟政策措施，包括管制奢侈品與競爭性產品進口和禁止金銀出口等。

重商主義者認為一國財富的多寡，主要反映在其所擁有真貴金屬的多寡上面，財富的累積，則可透過貿易順差而達成。所以當時國家的重要目標任務，就是如何獲取更多的財富。當一國的出口大於進口時，即可從貿易對手國，獲得黃金或白銀等財富，而其貨幣供給量也將隨著這些財富的累積而增加。但因世界資源固定，一國財富的累積，必須建立在他國財富減少的基礎上，所以，財富分配是一種零合遊戲（zero-sum game）。「零和遊戲」為我方之得，即為對方之所失，既然建立在對方之「所失」的基礎上，顯然國家要建立一支強大的軍隊與商業船隊，才能取得及維護財富，所以當時許多列強位爭奪海外殖民地，而爆發國家之間的戰爭。

重商主義者認為人基於追求私利所作之決策，往往與國家利益互為衝突，因此力主政府干預的必要。由於重商主義盛行的年時代，也正是金本位（Bullionism）的時代，因此，重商主義者主張：政府應控制所有貴重金屬的交換；除非有必要，否則嚴格禁止黃金、白銀以及其他重要金屬的出口，違者甚至處以死刑。為獲取最大進出口貿易利益，政府可將某一路線或地區的交易權，賦予某些公司，也因此，進出口貿易為少數貿易商所獨占；例如，當時加拿大的哈德遜公司（Hudson Buy Company）；荷蘭東印度貿易公司（Dutch East India Trading Company）等，都是當時主要的貿易商。此外，為獲取較大貿易順差以累積財富，政府在對外貿易政策方面，除補貼出口外，也採取配額或高關稅等嚴格的進口貿易管制措施；在對內經濟政策上，對製造商給予補貼、免稅以及其他特殊待遇，並採取低工資政策，以維持其商品在國際上的競爭力。

歐研所育竹

重商主義（mercantilism）主張為追求權力與財富，國家可不惜動用武力，且以人為方式積極干預經濟的父權思想（patern alistic）。重商主義是歐洲於16-18世紀中葉採行為各國基於本國政治的需求所採用的的經濟政策，重視貿易差額（順差），強調出口限制進口，以換取金、銀等貴重金屬，以提高國內財富，故重商主義並非替商人服務，而是為國家制定方針與政策服務。其強調金銀是國家唯一的財富，對外貿易向他國取得金銀是國家增加財富的最佳方法。而且強調國家必須積極干預經濟，甚至為累進財富不惜動用武力，追求權力與財富為各國的目標。
 重商主義基本要義是一國為追求富強，必定促使該國之國際貿易呈現出超，因在出口大於進口下，該國之國際收支帳將有黃金、白銀等貴金屬流入，使得國富民強。 重商主義強調積累金銀貨幣和對外貿易的重要性，把金銀看作是財富的唯一形式，認為國家的繁榮依賴於資本（貴金屬）的供應，貿易的全球規模是不可改變的，資本量可通過多出口少進口來增加，對外貿易是財富的真正源泉，要獲取更多的金銀財富只有通過出超，因此主張在國家的支持下發展對外貿易，強調商品與勞務出口大於進口的重要性。為達到這一目標，應該政府鼓勵出口限止進口。國際社會處於一種彼此爭奪權力與財富的無政府狀態。國家間關係是一種「零和」博弈。一個國家要改變或改善自己的國際地位，就只有掠奪別國的財富。重商主義強烈意味保護及增進絕對王權與貴族或枉顧國民利益之跨國大企業的利益。新重商主義基本上是以國家為 （一個公司的思考方式）雖然也包括了福利國家的措施, 但是主要以【個人的(或企業體的)解決問題過程】 方式思考國家經濟問題，其基本論點是國家的生存、自主和安全是國家最高的政策目標，國家可不惜花任何代價達成這些目標，而工業化是達成目標的必要手段。
 重商主義經濟學說有以下的特徵： 
 1．著重生產面分析，忽略消費面分析。 
 2．主張低工資、低成本，貿易出超，累積黃金等財富。 
 3．用關稅、配額等措施抑制進口。 
 4．政府干預刺激本國生產。

歐研所 肇偉

[編輯] 重商主義興起背景及其假設

西元1550年至1750年間，歐洲盛行重商主義的的經濟思想。主要原因為：1.地理的新發現，提供新的貿易機會，如印度航線及新大陸的發現。2.貴金屬的新供應，不僅獲利更多，而且資本累積更加容易。3.殖民的擴張，增加及確保新市場及原料供應地。

重商主義假設社會處在未充分就業狀態下，故貨幣供給的增加，可刺激經濟的成長。因為貿易順差有利於經濟，而貿易順差則不利於經濟，在此種思想背景景下，商人被視為一個經濟體系能否成公運作的重要階層，而勞工則是生產中重要的生產要素。因此，重商主義者信奉勞動價值說（Labor Theory of Value），主張商品的價值應取決於動投入的多寡。 　 重商主義在經濟史上，一方面是由封建經濟到資本主義經濟的轉捩點，沒有重商主義是不會有資本主義；另一方面重商主義是資本主義的對立產物，不打倒重商主義，資本主義是無由發展。在17世紀至18世紀初，重商主義是歐洲的主要經濟思想，具有悠久的歷史。其中心人物有法國的Jean Bodin、義大利的Antonnio Serra、德國的Johamm Toachin Becher以及英國的Thomas Mun。

歐研所　育竹

[編輯] 重商主義的發展背景與現況概述

   自封建主義解體之後16～17世紀是西歐資本原始積累時期的一種經濟理論或經濟體系，該名稱最初是由亞當•斯密在《國民財富的性質和原因的研究》（《國富論》）一書中提出來的。學術界代表人物是斯圖爾特，政界的著名代表人物是法國路易十四的大臣讓-巴普蒂斯特•柯爾貝爾，因此重商主義也被稱作「柯爾貝爾主義」(Colbertism)。

   這一時期商業資本興起，促使封建自然經濟瓦解，各國國內市場統一，並通過對殖民地的掠奪和對外貿易的擴張積累了大量貨幣財富，推動了工場手工業發展，因而產生了代表商業資本利益和要求的重商主義經濟思想。

   重商主義學派是現代早期經濟學的主導學派，產生於15世紀，全盛于16、17世紀，瓦解于17世紀下半葉資產階級階段古典經濟學興盛時期，是最早運用政治經濟學方法研究國際問題的理論學派。主張國內政府對經濟的干預和控制，就在這一時期許多現代資本主義制度建立。重商主義學派的發展經歷了早期的重金主義和晚期的貿易差額論兩個階段。

   其次，國際政治經濟學發展至今，在過去的一百五十年中，逐漸地由自由主義、民族主義以及馬克思主義分化了人類生活，上述三種道德與知識立場之間的重大分歧，圍繞在社會組織與經濟事務對市場的腳色與意義上。此三項意識型態對於社會、國家、市場關係的基本概念皆不同，所發展出的解讀方式也存在許多爭議與差異。

資料來源：維基百科 羅伯特‧吉爾平著，楊宇光等譯，2005，《國際關係中的政治經濟分析》，桂冠圖書：台北。

亞太所 林詠

[編輯] 重商主義的主張

基於重商主義這種政策與策略性特質，過去的學者因而對於重商主義所含政府與企業間的特定關係卻有不同的詮釋與說明。例如，亞當史密斯認為重商主義就是商業街曾利用國家公權力，以確保他們的壟斷並謀取私利，故有害整體經濟福利與發展；德國歷史學派的史末樂（Gustaw Schmoller）認為重商主義是政府在建國過程中用以控制企業的重要政策；一些國際貿易與國際政治經濟學者，如Rober Gilpin和Leonard Gomes則強調政府與企業聯合追求權利與財富的特質。即便不同學者對重商主義有不同見解，但仍有其共通內容，如下：

第一：重視由外國輸入金銀。因為當時認為貧富的標準，就在金銀的多寡。金銀多，國家富；金銀越多，國家越富。為使國家累積更多的金銀，唯一辦法是由外國輸入。Bech曾謂「本國所有的金銀，自當保存；並應從外國源源輸入。因為金銀是一個地方的靈魂與神經」。

第二：國家支助獨占性的企業活動，並提供關稅保護：受到關照的企業在國內享受扶持與協助，在國外市場上則得到經營特許權。

第三：所謂的經濟福利是以國家的財富來定義，而非以滿足社群的消費偏好為主，政府希望國內的消費能盡量壓低。

第四：利率受到政策性的壓低，以減少生產與存貨的成本。同時，國內的儲蓄率受到鼓勵而相當高，國內的貨幣存量也很充裕。

第五：重視國內人口的增加。其主要原因為，第一人口增加將有更多人力從事海外貿易；其次人口增加，代表本國從事工業人口增加。凡此種種，都為增加國家之金銀所必須之手段。而且，一個國家想要發展對外貿易，要由外國輸入金銀，這必會引起國與國間的衝突。故在傅國的目的之下，還須以強兵為手段，故而需增加國內人口。

綜合上述論點，重商主義的特徵是

1. 貴重金屬是一國財富之根本與強盛的象徵，因此限制金銀的輸出。

2. 貿易順差：強調國際收支為正，以累積金銀。

3. 擴張本國出口：鼓勵出口、阻遏進口，以防本國貴重金屬外流。

4. 減免輸出稅捐，以降低成本。

5. 貿易獨占。

歐研所　育竹

[編輯] 對重商主義的批評

重商主義的盲點有三：

1. 視出售商品較有利，購買商品為損失。故並非從事參與國際貿易的國家都能得到好處，而只有輸出國得到利益，而忽略經濟活動在於滿足人類需求。

2. 世界經濟的大餅（economic pie）是固定的。 一個國家若要達到對外貿易順差及獲致貿易的益處，就必然會以犧牲其貿易夥伴國家為代價。如此這樣長期處於貿易的逆差的國家，必然會與長期處於貿易順差國家產生緊張的關係。

3. 引爆殖民戰爭。為控制更多海外殖民地而發動對外戰爭，導致人類生命的損失。

對重商主義批判最具持續影響力的兩位學者，一為亞當史密斯（Adam Smith），另一位為大衛休姆（David Hume）：

一、亞當斯密的批判

世界經濟大餅並非是固定的，國際貿易可以更為專業的促使國家間的分工，進而增加各國的生產力及整個世界的生產量。亞當斯密（Adam Smith）對國際貿易的看法是動態的，其認為透過自由貿易，貿易國間是可能獲得貿易的好處，亦即兩國透過自由貿易，這兩國都會同時獲致更高的生產效率，並達到更高的消費水準。1776年亞當史密斯出版《國富論》（The Weaith of Nations），其全書四分之一的篇幅對重商主義的批判。首先亞當史密斯對於mercantilism一詞譯稱重商主義，認為不恰當。其主要原因為：1. 重商主義者所重之「商」並非國內商業，而是指外國商業。對於重商主義者來說，國內商業不論如何發達，猶如「一個人從右手轉給左手」，是不會增加國家財富的，財富僅是在民間移轉而已。2. 重商主義者所重之外國商業，也只限於出口商業；因為出口商業發達，外國的金銀財寶才會進來，進口發達代表把國的金銀財寶的損失。亦即「進口」只能為「出口」而存在，也可以說「進口」的存在，只為增加「出口」的一種手段。3. 重商主義者重商其名，重金是實。重商是為重金，重商是手段，重金是目的。

亞當斯密認為一個國家之財富是取決其產能（Production Capacity）而不是取決於其貴金屬支持有量的多寡。因此亞當斯密認為每個人自力之追求會使每個人特殊之才能趨向專業化之生產，而與他人互相交換勞務及商品。為了增加產能，他更進一步政府沒有必要對私有經濟進行管制，自由放任的政府政策和市場經濟，最能提供增加國家財富之環境。

二、大衛休姆的批判

大衛休姆在Political Discourse一書中，提出「價格調整及黃金流動」（price-specie-flow mechanosm）的機制，對重商主義的國際貿易政策，從兩個角度提出強烈的批評。

1. 國際收支：大衛休姆質疑一國可以在完全不影響該國國際競爭地位的情形下，繼續積累黃金的主張。他認為當一國因貿易順差而累積黃金時，國內貨幣供給量將增加，且工資與商品價格隨之上漲，出口競爭力因此下跌。反之，貿易逆差國則因黃金的流出，而減少其貨幣供給，工資與商品價格自然下跌，出口競爭力因而上漲。這就有如兩個水池相連通後，水會由水位較高的水池流向較低者，直到兩個水池的水位等高後而停止。因此，透過自動調整機能，一國不可能長期處在貿易順差或逆差狀態，國家的對外貿易順差，只可能在短期間存在；長期而言，該國的對外貿易順差將會自動消失。

2. 貿易對手國的反應：大衛休姆認為一國不可能長期持續累積財富，而不會受到外國報復。尤其長期處於逆差的國家，在結構上與順差的國家，處於緊張的狀態。這樣的狀態，即使在自由貿易的時代，亦是相當明顯。以美日貿易關係為例，日本在1970年代的大量出口，使得美國在1970年代末期定立「價格觸動機制」（trigger price mechanism），進行對日本的反傾銷調查，以及1981年所協議的日本汽車自動出口設限（VER），1986年半導體貿易及機械工具出口的限制。

歐研所　育竹

[編輯] 重商主義的國家發展政策

基於重商主義所含「政府與企業間存在著國主義式聯合」的特質，錫歐文（David J. Sylvan）認為人類歷史上的重商主義可以分為

三波：第一波盛行於17、18世紀的西歐，由政府採取主動且強調統一、財富與權力的重商主義；第二波是19世紀以李斯特（Fredrick List）為代表，強調的是國民經濟（national economy）的統一與發展的德國保護主義；第三波則是20世紀面對金本位體制的崩潰與經濟大恐慌（the Depression），而由波蘭義（Karl Polanyi）與凱因斯（John M. Keynes）所喚起的福利國家政策與接踵而來的心保護主義措施。代表重商主義第二波的李斯特主張：每個經濟體制都可能處於不同的經濟發展階段，故身處比較低發展階段的政府，必須制定且實行高關稅與貿易管制等政策，才能防止外來的經濟入侵，並保護幼稚民族工業。代表第三波的凱因斯則認為：當社會需求不足時，政府應該採取積極作為的財政政策、貨幣政策或社會移轉支付，以增加公共投資、刺激消費或擴張宗家社會需求，以彌補市場價格機能的不足，並促成充分就業。在福利國家的政策與原則的影響下，自1960年代中其重商主義逐漸增強為新保護主義，更進衣部發展而包括自動設限、雙邊經貿與匯率諮商，及以品管或環保等行政性措施為藉口的非關稅性障礙。

黑格德（Stephen Mark Haggard）將上列三波的重商主義分別稱為「追求權利的重商主義」（Power Mercantilism）、「追求發展的重商主義」（Developmental Mercantilism）和「追求福利的重商主義」（Welfare Mercantilism）。他並且認為第一種以及第三種都是先進核心國家的經濟信條，而第二種則是依賴與後進國家的經濟信條。

另有學者認為第一波的重商主義除追求國家的權利外，還包括財富與國家的統一，更重要的是還可能具有發展產業與增加就業機會的意義。因此，此一時期重商主義最重要的措施即為累積金銀而開始管制外匯，乃現代國家的累積外匯，且普遍為二次戰後發展中國家及新興工業國家所奉行。其次，第三波重商主義中，強調社會福利政策和自動設限、雙邊主義（Bilateralism）、品管、環保等非關稅性障礙者，故然都是新進核心國家，但是凱因斯市的財政、貨幣與出口擴張政策，仍廣為發展中國家與新興工業化家所採行，例如，獎勵投資、設立工業園區、增加公共投資等。另外，第二波重商主義最重要的關稅政策，不但見於強調進口替代工業化的發展中國家，也見於先進國家對農業、夕陽工業的保護，更見諸於區域性的經濟整合運動中。

由上可知，重商主義是政策措施種類繁多，三波重商主義的說法，頂多只能表明不同時期主要政策措施的不同方式，但卻不能隨及推論不同方式的措施僅適用於特定不同發展階段的國家。同時，後一波的重商主義措施也不必然完全否定前一波重商主義措施的被施行。政府是否採行重商主義措施，或採行哪一種方式和類型的重商主義措施，完全取決於政府與主要企業間在特定相關國內與國外整體政經環境中的關係，而不限於不同發展階段本身所界定的關係，

歐研所　育竹

[編輯] 新重商主義

由於各國所採行重商主義政策措施的複雜性，有些學者乾脆以「新重商主義」（Neo-mercantilism）泛稱他們，以別於17、18世紀盛行於西歐而重統一、權利與金銀累積的古典重商主義。新重商主義政策包括關稅、非關稅貿易障礙、配額、雙邊主義、鼓勵出口、管制貿易、經援、軍援、國際文教合作及國際性軍產複合（Military-industrial Complex）活動等對外政策。也包括國內各種經濟、財政、貨幣、外匯政策或與經濟發展政策相關的規劃、公共投資、所得政策、能源政策、科技文教政策及中小企業支持政策等。這些政俄涉及各種層面，也涵蓋三波重商主義的各種與各類政策措施。

歐研所　育竹

[編輯] 參考文獻

何瓊芳《國際貿易理論與政策》。台北：三民書局，2005。

楊樹人《國際貿易理論與政策》。台北：大中國圖書，1975。

蕭全政，《台灣地區的新重商主義》。台北：國家政策研究中心，1991。

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[編輯] 新重商主義的面具

任何新型態的經濟現實，背後都蘊涵一種新的經濟秩序，這種經濟秩序是由社會認同的道德原則所設計。重商主義興起於市場經濟崛起時，在市場經濟興起之前的封建體制中，經濟體中的人彼此交往原則是權利與義務，而非基於交換並以追求利益為目的的市場經濟體系。利益躍上舞台後，面對的第一個問題就是財富的最終來源是什麼？在重商主義者看來，財富是由人力所創造，要使之成為現實就是鼓勵商業與貿易，這就是基於市場競爭的本質。貿易是國民財富成長的關鍵，推動貿易的關鍵在商業，發展商業目的在保證生產者的利潤，為保護生產者利潤因此要壟斷與管制。這種由自利，進而對未來發展的樂觀看法，就表現在對成長的追求；而這追求過程受到市場競爭本質的引導。 以上的觀念與啟蒙時代Smith 的進步觀是一致的。啟蒙時期，對人類自我完善能力，以及推動人類進步具高度樂觀主義。然而，這種進步觀還是有分歧，一是，認為進步是一種必然進程，具有可界定和可預測的目標 ；也有人認為這快樂結局只是一種信仰。二是，認為進步具有規律性 ；有人則認為，進步只是各種不同因素的相互作用，其結果雖然是積極，的但還是不確定。Smith 雖然對科學和法律規則的理性持客觀態度，也強調利用人的其他方面的重要性，如用人的性格陶冶來促進社會進步。從社會的角度看，追求自私的個人發展和榮耀時，競爭和個人理性在追求自我利益時，可以總體上促進社會經濟的進步。但在蘇格蘭的歷史觀影響下，這進步卻不具備可預測目標。一直到這種進步觀與功利主義幸福觀結合，開始試圖衡量作為進步的幸福。 功利主義的特徵是，可以將所有快樂、各種類型的慾望用單一的標準衡量。人類活動的目標應該重視實現利益最大化；道德的目標應該是，使大多數人得到最大幸福。功利主義將所有價值都試圖用可衡量的單位來測量，特別是用物質標準看世界，這特徵與經濟學得到契合。加上經濟學在邊際革命後，急欲科學化經濟學，這種功利主義也滿足客觀化標準。這種結合，將經濟學所考慮的市場是什麼，被轉換為，整體社會應該是作行動計畫；也就是，它只不過用來促進預定的價值選擇，這價值選項就是功利的社會福利。功利主義與自由市場的這種連結，使人類的進步觀轉向功利主義的幸福觀。這種幸福觀在經濟學進一歩轉變為福利觀。 效用理論發展之後，為了避免人與人之間效用的比較，上述福利觀的衡量標準由帕雷圖效率取代。這在狹義上說還是功利主義的概念，因為它是以市場是否實現偏好最大化，來判斷行為結果；也就是，經過市場的交易過程，使偏好最適化的結果達到某一狀態之後，就不可能再進行互利的交換了，這樣的一種判准。一般均衡理論就是用這一種效率的標準，將Smith 看不見的手連接起來，由於功利主義與經濟理論，無法找到一效用量化指標來衡量公平，效率的標準就佔了上風，因此，經濟效率又取代了幸福的功利主義目標。 準由帕雷圖效率取代。這在狹義上說還是功利主義的概念，因為它是以市場是否實現偏好最大化，來判斷行為結果；也就是，經過市場的交易過程，使偏好最適化的結果達到某一狀態之後，就不可能再進行互利的交換了，這樣的一種判准。一般均衡理論就是用這一種效率的標準，將Smith 看不見的手連接起來，由於功利主義與經濟理論，無法找到一效用量化指標來衡量公平，效率的標準就佔了上風，因此，經濟效率又取代了幸福的功利主義目標。 然而，重商主義與Smith 的進步觀將重點放在，以科學和技術為代表的理性不斷進步，以及相應的經濟成長和物質繁榮上，技術進步和經濟成長，保證人類不斷取得幸福和社會福利的進步。在重商主義是對財富的追求，在Smith 則是消費水準的提升。事實上，雖然Smith 攻擊重商主義體系，但他攻擊的是壟斷體制，對這種進步的發展觀與追求財富本質上是一致。按照Smith 經濟成長的觀念，國民財富的增加依靠勞動生產力的提高，而勞動生產力的提高則受制於社會的分工，要促進社會分工就需要積蓄資本和擴大市場範圍。而資本的積蓄則是基於個人的節儉；擴大市場範圍則是基於個人的交換傾向，節儉和交換的動機正是努力改善自身境況的自愛心，自利心透過市場競爭使秩序產生，這種秩序就能達到國民財富的增長，使社會和諧運作。這在資本主義發展過程中，與重商主義是一致的，重商主義在市場經濟崛起後，追求商業利益、對財富的泉源的追求，就是這種進步觀的濫觴。 以上的討論，有助於思考經濟全球化論述中的一些爭議，特別是有關國家角色的議題。爭論的一方認為：經濟全球化使主權國家不復存在﹔或民族國家正在「衰退」、「撤退」﹔甚至宣告「民族的危機」、「國家的消亡」。最流行的說法透過媒體傳播宣稱：市場已經取代國家在經濟事務中的制高點，民族國家在經濟領域的角色功能已進入尾聲。陣營的另一方認為：只要國家願意，就能擺脫這種困境；而且管理全球經濟活動的基本能力還是要靠國家39。特別是全球化程度最深的金融部門，國家還是主要的管理力量。 防衛陣營最主要的論證理由是：許多國家的經濟體依然是自我控制的，也就是，經濟事務上最主要的決策，依然是由各個國家的政府做出；站在管理全球經濟秩序的角度看，各國政府持續會對其他行動者設定遊戲規則，並使用國家所能想到的權力，去影響經濟體。由本文以上的論證，這種說法最大問題在：有些國家可以不被全球化，全球化依然侷限在很小的一部分。然而，由於市場競爭的本質，經濟全球化是資本主義擴張的結果，在這一過程，國家是被迫全球化。雖然如此，國家的角色並不會衰退，理由是本文以上發現的：市場本質是競爭，而這種競爭的概念是有別新古典自由主義經濟所設想的競爭狀態；再者由於人類進步觀的意識形態，國家的目的是發展、是財富的累積。就此而論，由於市場經濟的崛起，在資本主義全球擴張的範圍上講，重商主義，經濟自由主義都是廣義的經濟民族主義，也就是本文所指的新重商主義。 在國際經濟領域裡，常將新重商主義解釋成經濟民族主義，又由於對自由主義核心觀念的誤讀，因此，常常將新重商主義與經濟自由主義對立起來。這當然源於對經濟思想的誤讀，因為古典自由貿易作為經濟自由主義的濫觴，因此將經濟自由主義與重商主義對立。其實，兩者本質上不僅沒有太大差別，雙方都把貿易當作提高國家利益與經濟成長的工具。Smith 為了經濟成長，擴大市場與國際分工，主張自由貿易；換言之，自由貿易作為國家利益的手段，在Smith 是作為抵制壟斷的武器。同樣的，由Ricador 提出的差額地租理論了解到，地租是被價格所決定，為了降低價格，依然要主張自由貿易。從這一角度看經濟自由主義與重商主義都是一種經濟民族主義，而不是將重商主義等同經濟民族主義並與經濟自由主義對立起來。換言之，經濟自由主義與重商主義都是經濟民族主義，是為了適應市場競爭本質所採對策不同而已。 競爭是市場本質；也是動態的。在經濟全球化過程，資本主義的競爭表現在差異化的程度，換言之，差異化導致進步。正如Marshall 一世紀之前斷言：每一個地方都有它自己的獨特經歷，會通過不同方式影響到其間各商業階層的組織方式⋯變異的趨勢是進步的主要原因。因此，面對全球化的挑戰；競爭情勢的新面貌，民族國家一個主要作用是累積、再造和保護社會資本，以增強競爭能力，實現民族利益。可以說，國家的角色不僅沒有衰退；還扮演掌握國家進步的機制。國家作為積極的經濟行動者，承擔成長的特定作用，只是面對不同階段資本主義的發展，為確保民族利益的手段不同。早期對貿易順差的重視、支持自由貿易、支持或推動工業化、產業政策的領導角色，以至目前全球開放的經濟全球化都是新重商主義的一環。

[編輯] 國家經濟戰略

分析個別國家如何面對經濟全球化的挑戰，並根據其社會狀況與政治環境擬定出回應之道。早在1970年代初期部分學者便開始注意個別國家對外經濟依存程度增加時所必須面對的脆弱度(vulnerability)和敏感度(sensibility)問題。在這些被稱為「國家經濟戰略」(economic statecraft)的研究中，比較著名的是Klaus Knorr 和Robert Gilpin。Knorr的研究著重在國際經濟相互依賴程度加深的過程中，個別國家如何採取相應政策以避免國內的經濟與社會秩序受到更大傷害。Robert Gilpin的研究重點則在國際經濟關係的變化如何影響國際上的政治關係，而個別國家又會採取何種政策來影響國際經濟。他以這個原則提出國際政治經濟學的三個主要傳統：自由主義、馬克思主義、國家經濟主義。隨著國際局勢的演變，近年來有愈來愈多的國家傾向於以經濟的方法而非軍事行動來為達到政治的目的，使得研究「國家經濟戰略」又再度成為一種熱門的研究趨勢。國家經濟戰略

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[編輯] 國家主義

(亞太所蔡承哲)

民族主義，亦稱國族主義或國家主義，為包含民族、種族、與國家三種認同在內的意識形態，主張以民族為人類群體生活之「基本單位」，以作為形塑特定文化與政治主張之理念基礎。具體的說，其主張為：民族為「國家存續之唯一合法基礎」，以及「各民族有自決建國之權」。民族主義與愛國主義無從區分。開化的社會過去大多強調民族共同體，而最近則著重於由國家或政府陳述的文化或政治共同體。

民族主義亦特指民族獨立運動之意識型態，即以民族之名義作出文化與政治主張，如今通常用以敘述英格蘭；民族主義也同時被稱為凝聚民族共同體的學說。民族主義的兩種度量標準（與相異的方法論）為本尼迪克特·安德森(Benedict Anderson)之《想像的共同體》(Imagined Communities)以及利婭·格林菲爾德(Liah Greenfeld)之《民族主義：現代化五途》(Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity)。

民族主義者以明確的準則為基礎界定民族，以自其他民族區別，並據以判定「孰為民族之一員」。其準則可包含共同的語言、文化、以及價值取向，但於今最主要者或為族群意識(ethnicity)，即種族上之歸屬與躋身其中之地位。民族之「認同」與以上兩者以及族群上之「歸屬感」皆有相關。民族主義者視民族性為排他且非自主，也就是不像其他自主性團體般可自由加入。

民族主義以民族特色看待人類活動。各民族有其民族表徵(national symbols)、民族特色(national character)、民族文化(national culture)、民族音樂、民族文學( national literature)、 民俗(folklore)，甚至在若干例子中，尚且帶有民族宗教(national religion)。個人作為民族之一員，共享民族性價值體系與民族認同，敬佩民族英雄，進食民族性菜餚，從事民族性運動。

因民族國家已成為國家結構的主流，民族主義對世界歷史和地緣政治影響巨大。世界上絕大多數人口都生活在─至少是名義上的─民族國家之中。「民族」(nation)一詞常錯誤地被等同於這些國家政府(state)。民族國家之目的在確保民族存續，保持身份認同，並提供民族文化與社會性格(ethos)可支配的地域。民族國家大多訴諸文化與歷史神話以自證其存續與「法統」(legitimacy)。

民族主義者認可「非民族國家」的存在，其實，早期的民族主義運動往往是針對帝國，諸如奧匈帝國之倫。梵諦岡是為了天主教的領導權，而非民族，所存在的主權國家；而伊斯蘭教徒尋求於全球各地所建立的哈里發為另一個非民族國家的例子。

具民族認同，並以民族國家為法統之任何人皆可稱之為「民族主義者」。依此理念，大多數成年人皆為「消極性的民族主義者」。然而，如今所謂之「民族主義」一詞涉及以政治活動（或涉及軍事）支持民族主義者的主張，其中或包含分離主義、民族統一主義(irredentism)、以及軍國主義，在極端的情況下甚至包含「種族清洗」。政治學上（以及媒體）傾向註意這些極端類形的民族主義。

[編輯] 國際政經整合潮流淡化國家角色

在經濟戰場上，經濟作為不同於以屈服對方意志為目的的軍事或政治行動，而是以交換、互通有無，獲致共存共榮為準則。由於經濟行為和活動，無非圍繞商業性互補、互利原則，因之，其間問題的處理和解決，自然不同於軍事、政治上的征服和對抗，「協調」可謂是其基本手法。也由於是互補、互利的行為和活動，國家主權，國境這道高牆厚壁，在商業無國界、經濟自由化、全球化、世界貿易一體化之衝擊下，自然而然變低變薄。為利商業上往來交流，各國無不自行放低、放鬆主權至上的堅持與嚴謹的出入國管制。如商業簽證的易於取得、外資的引進、金融、技術的合作、國家間政策管制的協調等，均為追求更高的經濟利益所採取之行動。EU的成立即為其明設。國家這道藩籬無形中變薄變矮。 在市場經濟之前，國家屏障輕而易舉地被穿透，人員、物資、資本、資訊等如洪水般地在國家間大量而快速地湧進湧出，個別國家已不可能置身世界經濟潮流之外。表面上看來固如岩盤的國家區隔，實際上其內部的大小、公私等組織，如中央政府、地方自治體、各企業體等與他國、國際機構，跨國企業、NGO( 非政府組織 ) 等之間無不存在著無數有形無形、互連互動之管道，確實給國際關係帶來重大而複雜之變數。 個別國家已幾乎無法採取單獨而有效之行動。換言之，以國家為前提的國際關係一般理論，在冷戰後已無法作有效分析。90年代起傳統的國家觀日漸變易，譬如隨著世界經濟全球化之深化，帶來愈來愈多的所謂「民間管制（private regulation）。亦即各國組織化的利益團體（如跨國企業等）之間，為利彼此金融貨幣、商務等之往來移動，執行並無政治性實施義務 (political accountability)之超國家管制。 因之，國際社會之行為主體(actor)不單僅是國家已至為明顯，但在可以完全取代國家地位之機構尚未出現之前，國家依然是政治力量之最大發源和歸趨之磁場是不變的。因為國際機構、非政府組織、跨國企業等雖與國家對等並存，其活動也超越國家界限，但彼等無不以國家為對手進行利害調整、位階肆應等問題仍然是無可迴避之課題並無改變。 亦即國家萬能、主權至高無上等傳統的國家觀，實質上雖有所改變並漸趨式微為不爭之事實。但在可預見的未來，國家之無可取代性卻也是事實。此一吊詭給予台海困局一重新思考之機會。亦即國家雖不可少，是否值得台灣冒生死存亡絕績之險以追求獨立頗值商榷。因為，是否必要為了在國際社會中取得一新的國家名義、地位，而付出台灣難以負荷之代價。 對北京來說，「國家」角色已日漸淡化，加上在「國家主權平等，國家地位不平等」之鐵律下，台灣即使建立新國家，至多只能取得中小的國家地位，並無損於北京之大國威風。因之，北京對台北意欲在國際社會中取得一資格、一席位之作為當作眼中釘，必欲除之而後快之反應，卻換來各國對北京之警戒、掣肘，大損國家利益，不禁令人對其決策之盲動生嘆。 現實國際社會中，國際政經發展潮流的確己日趨融合、緊密、複雜，而牽制國家行為之要素亦日增，相當減損了國家功能與主權之神聖不可侵犯性。因之，中台實有擱置「國家」，再闢蹊徑之必要。 資料來源：吳春宜著 從國際政治經濟發展趨勢探討兩岸關係結構變化。

[編輯] 背景與爭議

民族主義的一般性定義極為廣泛，其爭議遍及古今。民族主義的例子極其多樣，論及民族主義不時引致極端性的情緒，使得表述並定義民族主義極為困難。一個反覆發生的爭議是，人們以自身地區性的經驗來定義民族主義。對布列塔尼的民族主義者而言，國家民族主義與文化民族主義之爭為論戰焦點；對其他地區而言，其間的差異或無關緊要。民族主義的支持者經常擔憂，因民族主義衝突所產生的負面結果、種族衝突、戰爭、與內政上的衝突，會歸結至民族主義本身，導致旁人以負面角度看待民族主義的一般性觀點。他們認為經由最負面的觀點看待民族主義為扭曲原意。過份強調爭端，定將對一般性爭論的註意力轉移至民族國家的特徵等個案。

民族主義者的運動不一定聲稱自己的國家優於他國。他們或者就是主張，一個民族在容許自治的情況下，最好能夠分離，即民族自決之原則。然而，這經常承受來自有不同身份認同與法統的「敵對陣營」作意識型態上的攻擊。在以巴衝突中，雙方皆主張對方並非真正的民族，故無權建國；沙文主義(chauvinism)與極端愛國主義(Jingoism；主張對外實行戰爭政策)過份主張民族間的優越性；民族性的刻板印象極為常見，多具侮辱性。以上這些都是民族主義運動者抬頭的現象，也值得註意，但不足以成為民族主義的一般性理論基礎。極端類型的民族主義者幾乎全然自認為本國優於他國，而最極端的民族主義甚至會尋求摧毀非我族類的文化，導致種族滅絕以及世界性的浩劫。

(亞太所蔡承哲)

[編輯] 民族主義的理論之爭

首次對民族主義之研究為民族主義運動者的整體性的歷史論據。馬克思主義者與社會主義者在十九世紀末對民族主義運動所提供的政治性分析，後來活躍於中歐與東歐。民族主義大部分的社會學理論始自第二次世界大戰之後。

若干的民族主義理論為民族主義者自身所顧慮之爭議，如屬不屬於同一民族，以及「歸屬」一詞的確切意義。新近的一般性爭議專註於潛在性的爭議，以及國家民族孰先孰後的問題。民族主義運動者自認代表現存之民族，與民族主義基本教義派相互一致，將民族─至少是族裔團體─視同兩千年前的社會現實。

現代主義理論暗示，在公元1800年之前，並無人對居住地以外之處效忠。在歐洲，民族認同與國家一統為因應經濟與社會現代化所需，自上而下所強加。據此，民族主義衝突為意料之外的副作用。

較新的民族主義理論受後現代主義所影響，強調民族為社會結構現象。潘乃迪克·安德森將民族表述為「想像的共同體」(imagined communities)。恩斯特·格爾納(Ernest Gellner)評論道：「民族主義並非民族自我認知的覺醒：它只是在不存在民族的各處虛構出(invent)各民族。」（安德森與蓋爾勒的「想像」與「虛構」等詞為描述用的中性用法，並非暗示民族為虛構或者想像。）現代的理論則視印刷術與資本主義等事物為民族主義之所必需。

安東尼·史密斯(Anthony Smith)則提出綜合傳統與後現代的觀點。據史密斯所言，形成民族的先決條件為（現存或歷史上的）確定的祖國、高度自治、具敵意的環境、爭鬥的記憶、宗教性的核心、語言文字、特殊的習俗、歷史記錄與想法。史密斯認為民族經由全體人民（非僅精英份子）、法制與政治體制、民族主義意識形態、國際承認、與劃界等條件的匯聚，而形成。

(亞太所蔡承哲)

[編輯] 民族主義的歷史發展

1900年之前

1815年至1870年間，各個獨立公國逐漸統一為義大利國大多數的民族主義理論皆假定歐洲為民族國家之濫觴。雖有爭議，一般通常認為現代國家始自1648年之威斯特伐里亞條約。該條約開創威斯特伐里亞系統式的國家，即彼此互相承認主權與領土。簽約國中，如荷蘭合省邦聯（Dutch United Provinces，當時的稱呼）被視為民族國家，但德國並無對等情況，儘管神聖羅馬帝國幾乎據有當時全體說德語的國家。1648年，多數歐洲強權尚非民族國家。其他的看法為拿破崙啟動民族主義，並使民族主義達到預料之外的程度。

許多人，但非全部，認為民族國家最主要的轉變源自18世紀晚期與19世紀。自浪漫式民族主義(romantic nationalism)開始，民族主義運動者於歐洲遍地興起，當中有些為反對大帝國的分離主義者，另有尋求一統分隔零散的領土，如德國與義大利。這些運動促進民族認同與民族文化，且獲得成功。19世紀末，人們多數接受歐洲劃分為多個民族，且自我認同於其中之一。奧匈帝國與鄂圖曼帝國於第一次世界大戰後崩潰，加速了民族國家之形成。

依據標準觀點，十九世紀之前，人們有鄉土性、區域性、或宗教性的效忠，但無國家觀念。典型的歐洲國家為皇室所統治的朝代國家，若高於區域性之效忠，則為由統治性家族所有之君主制。朝代國家可由皇室聯姻取得土地，又因分割繼承而失地─現今看來十分荒謬可笑。遠古時期，古希臘稱所有非希臘人為蠻族，但希臘的各城邦又經常為統治地位相互作戰。民族主義引入各民族領土範圍明確的觀念，並更進一步的應用於索求其他民族的土地。原則上，民族國家並不尋求克敵取地，然而，民族主義運動者們罕對邊界之劃定意見一致。隨著民族主義運動者之勃興，也為歐洲帶來了領土紛爭。

民族主義運動也決定了19世紀的歐洲政治。在民族為帝國一部之處，民族解放的奮鬥同時也是為抵抗先前的專制獨裁而奮鬥；在民族國家鞏固先前君主政體之地，如西班牙，民族主義自身成為保守及保皇勢力。民族主義運動大多始自對抗現有的安排，但到了20世紀，亦有政體(regime)自認為民族主義者。

19世紀民族國家起源之標準理論頗受爭議。其中之一在於南美洲人的獨立奮鬥，以及美國獨立革命先於歐洲的民族主義運動。有些國家，如荷蘭與英國，似於19世紀之前即有清楚之民族認同。而義大利之統一，為基於人種／語言之民族主義運動範例。

[編輯] 國內民族主義

民族主義運動者在達成建立民族國家之目的後，民族主義並不會就此消失，而是成為國內刺激政黨與政治運動的力量，通常以民族主義者或民族主義政治家形容之，使用國家主義(nationalistic)一詞或較為精確。民族主義於此種意義上所從事的政治運動為：

鞏固國家團結，包含危機出現時拯救國家的運動。 強調國家認同，受文化保守主義(cultural conservatism)及仇外(xenophobia)情緒所影響，排除外來作用。 在民族的生存空間上限制他族，尤其是移民。在極端的例子中，成為種族清洗。 併吞其認為屬於祖國之一部分的土地，通稱民族統一主義(irredentism)，源自義大利淪陷區(Italia irredenta)運動。 經濟民族主義，即以經濟政策，尤其是保護主義(protectionism)與反對自由貿易，以促進國家利益。 民族主義政黨與政治人物通常會極其強調國旗等民族象徵。

民族主義一詞也有延伸或隱喻性的用法，以描述某些促進群體認同的運動，特別是在美國，在文化上用於黑人民族主義與白人民族主義。此種用法或與民族主義的古典義意重疊，如黑人分離主義與泛非洲主義(pan-Africanism)。

民族主義者對自己國家明顯有正面看法，儘管這並不是民族主義的定義。情緒性訴諸於民族主義即使在穩定的民族國家中都清晰可見。民族的社會心理學包含民族認同（個人對群體的歸屬感）與民族尊嚴（與群體成功的自我連繫）。民族尊嚴與民族文化與政經力量的影響息息相關，儘管其影響或言過其實。最重要的因素為共有的情緒。在民族主義與運動上，若國家隊輸掉比賽，全民會有共同的失落感。

情緒影響亦可為全然負面：共同的危機感可鞏固民族。戲劇性的事件，如戰敗，可影響民族的認同。德國因於第一次世界大戰戰敗、凡爾賽條約的屈辱、以及經濟危機與惡性通貨膨脹(hyperinflation)，產生極度仇外心理、復仇主義（revanchism，一種外交政策,主要動機要收回失土）、以及納粹主義的興起。1914年之前以威廉二世為民族之父的堅實中產階級愛國者，不再能有所作為。

[編輯] 美國於2001年後的民族主義

九一一襲擊事件在美國掀起一陣表達民族主義的浪潮。在國際上譴責暴行的狂潮及對美國的公開支持後，美國的民族主義變得令外人難以接受與理解。在二戰後的西歐，尤其是法國、英國、與德國三國境內，許多美國人認為炫示國旗為過激行為。

許多人相信這場民族主義的衝擊帶起美國國家政策上的許多重大改變。於2001年10月26日簽署成為法律的美國愛國者法案(USA PATRIOT Act)，雖（許多人錶面上相信）是為反恐而設計，但被許多人認為係機構性地妨害公民自由(civil liberties)。這場衝擊可能也幫助喬治·沃克·布希的執政，導致美國入侵阿富汗與美伊戰爭。

跟其他所戰爭一樣，衝突自身在任何國家都會挑起民族主義情緒，非僅止於美國。例如說，包含加拿大人在內的反美民族主義情緒自2003年的伊拉克戰爭後戲劇性達到高峰2006 Liberal Canadian Press Room。隨著傷亡增加，反對繼續佔領並重建阿富汗與伊拉克的意見持續高漲，並使美國眾議院通過法案促使美國自伊拉克撤軍。2005年末的民調顯示布希總統的聲望為有史以來最低者之一，導因於高漲的反戰聲音。其他人認為這場「戰爭」目前已成為戰後的佔領，需要長期穩定的警政管理，以及阿富汗與伊拉克的民主化。這項由雙方提出的主張有似於60年代美國捲入越戰時的民心凝聚。其主要的差別在於美國於越戰是逐步擴大規模，而未能完全驅逐北越的反西方政府。

許多擁戰者將反對這場戰爭與／或重建過程者視為不切實際的理想主義者、自以為是、偽善。反戰者則引用對民心凝聚的爭論，令人聯想到美國於19世紀昭昭天命的觀念。有些人指控反戰者不愛國，甚至於叛國。若干擁戰的評論員表示，覺得新聞對美國的負面報導因破壞美國軍隊達到反恐戰爭的最終勝利而助長敵人氣焰。因反戰者對此種指控感到憤恨，這項政治爭端造成彼此持續對立。

儘管軍事主力在兩國徹底獲勝，持久自由行動(Operation Enduring Freedom)在改革阿富汗政治與重建伊拉克上進展緩慢。儘管兩國於2006年一月邁出民主政治改革的第一步，朝向奠定長期和平、穩定、正義的基礎Afghan Parliament Convenes, Impending Iraqi Nationwide Elections。許多在911後美國情緒高漲的民族主義者們擁護這些未完的改革與重建程序所可能帶來的長期利益。在此緩慢的進程中，關於產生這場國家重建的軍事行動的真正動機，與在倫理方面的爭議，仍在持續，而關於民族主義的爭議為此中關鍵。例如，美國所領導的軍事行動究竟是否構成帝國主義，或為審慎互利的新型世界主義。這些爭議的激烈程度與撕裂性或因媒體偏差(Media Bias)導致恐懼的文化(culture of fear)而起。媒體朝向遮掩兩國境內的暴力行為，尤其是伊拉克因反對外國佔領者與「通敵者」所產生的暴動。

許多反對美國與其盟國入侵伊拉克與阿富汗者將這些軍事行動稱為帝國主義，以「石油之戰」之名提醒世人石油帝國主義(Oil imperialism)之說。擁戰者們認為這些主張荒謬，他們視這些軍事行動為國際合作打倒阿富汗的塔利班與伊拉克復興黨(Baath Party)等專制獨裁政權；支持者們更認為這些入侵與佔領為在所謂恐怖主義與護教聖戰(jihad)猖獗之地改革社會政治背景的必要手段。論戰於冷戰期間的反共政策立場互異的鷹派與鴿派之間激烈展開，論戰的中心為權衡美國及其盟國在民族認同、國家安全、國家主權上與其他國家之間孰輕孰重。

因伊拉克與阿富汗兩國社會政治的發展（選舉、法制改革等）仍在持續，要歷史學家評斷孰是孰非或仍過早。支持兩國戰後重建者以現代西歐與日本的歷史例示中東地區歷經國際託管後可能的結果。儘管曾於二戰後經歷英裔美國人(Anglo-American)實質上的軍事佔領與重建達數十年（參見馬歇爾計畫），法、日、德等國後來自美國白人的佔領下獨立，今日已成為具國際影響力的頂尖經濟強權。

[編輯] 民族主義與極端主義

在穩定的民族國家中，民族主義雖然對日常生活具多面影響，但卻通常隱而不顯。邁克爾·比利希(Michael Billig)的「平實民族主義(banal nationalism)」的說法認為，日復一日，越來越不引人註意的民族主義，日日影響居民的想法。在西方民主國家，仇外與移民團體經常自稱為民族主義者，以避免種族主義(racism)這種貶義的稱呼。持此立場之政黨可能有眾多支持者，並進入國會。光頭黨(skinheads)等小而知名的團體同樣也自稱民族主義者作為國家社會主義者(national-socialist)或白人至上主義者(white supremacist)的婉轉稱呼。其他國家多稱其為極端民族主義者，帶著明顯的貶義。參見愛國沙文主義(chauvinism)與愛國侵略主義(jingoism)。

民族主義為包含法西斯主義等政治意識型態之要素，極端主義一詞通常用於此處。但簡單地將法西斯主義表述為民族主義之極端型式並不正確。法西斯主義在一般義意上為始自義大利的種族民族主義與國家民族主義之結合，明顯受納粹主義之影響。對於阿爾道夫希特勒在地理政治學的志向，可能帝國主義是較好的形容，且納粹德國治下的廣闊地域中有許多在歷中上並無德國人的蹤跡。納粹德國在與典型的歐式民族國家相較之下，自成一格（sui generis）。

這也可稱之為史達林主義。約瑟夫·史達林為民族主義專家，他對民族之定義廣受引用。在其統治下，蘇聯於蘇維埃共和國與各加盟共和國中定義並鼓舞民族認同。儘管如此，各共和國的主權仍遭否定，且俄羅斯化政策自相矛盾。於1945年遭蘇聯佔領的東歐國家亦有類似的遭遇。其統治面臨具強烈的民族主義特色卻含義糢糊的「蘇維埃」（實為俄羅斯）認同，尤其是在第二次世界大戰期間。

(亞太所蔡承哲)

[編輯] 依賴理論

依賴理論是第二次世界大戰後興起的一套國際關係與發展經濟學理論。它將世界劃分為先進的中心國家與較落後的邊陲國家，後者在世界體系中的地位使之受到中心國的盤剝，故得不到發展，或產生腐敗等弊病。

[編輯] 基本流派

關於中心/邊陲的界定，其間的機制與效應等問題，學界至今沒有定論，不過依賴理論的各流派中仍有共通的幾個命題，簡述如下：

世界分成中心國家與邊陲國家；伊曼紐·沃勒斯坦還進一步引入半邊陲國家的概念。 中心由工業國家構成，邊陲國家則向中心國家出口原料，並從事勞力密集產業為主。 邊陲之所以為邊陲，並非因為它是工業化浪潮的後進者（這是新古典主義經濟學的主張），而是在世界市場上受到制約所致，外力包括跨國企業、國際組織（例如國際貨幣基金）等等代表中心國家利益的力量。 因此邊陲國家的落後源自上述不平等的依賴關係，中心國家則賴此關係維持較高的工資及貿易利益，並減弱國內的階級矛盾。 準此，依賴理論對窮國開出的藥方是走自主發展之路、節制外資，並根據國民的真正需求調整產業結構（例如許多窮國大量出口農產品，人民卻有營養不足的問題）。部份學者更呼籲以社會革命出離依賴。

[編輯] 發展歷史

依賴理論首先是作為發展理論的反面在1950-60年代出世的，其提倡者是阿根廷經濟學家 Raúl Prebisch。根據古典經濟學，國際貿易會讓各國達到比較優勢，相互得益，但是 Prebisch 在拉丁美洲經濟委員會研究拉丁美洲的實際發展，引出了相反的結論：窮國財富的減少與著富國財富的增加一致。Paul Baran 根據馬克思主義政治經濟學完善了他的理論，此後各家蜂起。德國經濟學家 Andre Gunder Frank 使之成為馬克思主義的一支，Theotonio Dos Santos 考慮邊陲國對內及對外的關係，創建了「新依賴理論」。巴西前總統費爾南多·恩里克·卡多佐在流亡期間曾寫過許多相關論著。伊曼紐·沃勒斯坦則進一步發展其中的馬克思主義面向，稱之為世界體系理論。

[編輯] 互賴理論的局限

(亞太所蔡承哲)

Susan Strange 在“Political Economy and International Relations”文中指出了研究世界體系幾個重要面向:

一、經濟學家在研究區域整合的現象時往往分離了政治與經濟，而事實上政治與經濟是不可完全割裂的；

二、受到市場力量的影響，全球經濟結構都使得國家行為者在政治或經濟面向變的具脆弱性（vulnerable），而國家為了降低政治或經濟的脆弱性，因此除了在國際層次作出應對之外，也可能利用區域層次做出回應；

三、世界政治經濟中存在著兩種權力，結構性權力與聯繫性權力，聯繫性權力是甲使乙去做他本不願作的事情之權力，而結構性權力是形成和決定全球各種政治和經濟結構的權力，是決定做事方法的權力，決定國與國關係，國家與人民間之關係和國家與公司之間關係框架的權力，現今結構性權力變得越來越重要。

[編輯] 爭議

依賴理論遭到自由市場的鼓吹者反擊，他們主張依賴理論的藥方將造成腐敗及競爭不足等問題，印度與亞洲四小龍的崛起也不合乎依賴理論的預測。另一些學者則指出亞洲四小龍都曾實施進口替代政策，美援的因素也不容忽視[1]。

依賴-發展理論是依賴理論的變種，它主張跨國資本能在窮國的內需市場上牟利，所以邊陲也能得到部份的發展，但是這往往是以腐敗或社會兩極分化為代價的。

[編輯] 註記

1. ^ Hartman, John and Pamela B. Walters 1985: Dependence, military assistance and development: a cross national study, Politics and Society 14, 431-58 .

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[編輯] Dependency theory WIKI版

『亞太所 朱益賢』

Dependency theory is a body of social science theories, both from developed and developing nations, which are predicated on the notion that resources flow from a "periphery" of poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. It is a central contention of dependency theory that poor states are impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the "world system." This is based on the Marxist analysis of inequalities within the world system, but contrasts with the view of free market economists who argue that free trade advances poor states along an enriching path to full economic integration. As such, dependency theory figures prominently in the debate over how poor countries can best be enriched or developed.

[編輯] Basics

The premises of dependency theory are as follows:

• Poor nations provide market access to wealthy nations (e.g., by allowing their people to buy manufactured goods and obsolete or used goods from wealthy nations), permitting the wealthy nations to enjoy a higher standard of living.
• Wealthy nations actively (though perhaps unconsciously) perpetuate a state of dependence by various means. This influence may be multifaceted, involving economics, media control, politics, banking and finance, education, culture, sport, and all aspects of human resource development (including recruitment and training of workers).
• Wealthy nations actively counter attempts by dependent nations to resist their influences by means of economic sanctions and/or the use of military force.

Consistent with these assumptions, many dependency theorists advocate social revolution as an effective means to the reduction of economic disparities in the world system.

Dependency theory first emerged as a reaction to liberal free trade theories in the 1950s, advocated by Raúl Prebisch, whose research with the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) suggested that decreases in the wealth of poor nations coincided with increases in the wealth of rich nations. Paul A. Baran developed dependency theory from Marxian analysis. The theory quickly divided into diverse schools. Some, like Andre Gunder Frank, adapted it to Marxism. "Standard" dependency theory differs from Marxism, however, in arguing against internationalism and any hope of progress in less developed nations towards industrialization and a liberating revolution. Theotonio Dos Santos described a 'new dependency', which focused on both the internal and external relations of less-developed countries of the periphery, derived from a Marxian analysis. Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso wrote extensively on dependency theory while in political exile, arguing that it was an approach to studying the economic disparities between the centre and periphery. The American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein refined the Marxist aspect of the theory, and called it the "World-system." It has also been associated with Galtung's Structural Theory of Imperialism.

[編輯] Spread of theory

The theory became popular in the 1960s and 1970s as a criticism of modernization theory (also known as development theory), which was falling increasingly out of favor due to continued widespread poverty in much of the world. As such, dependency theory stands in sharp contrast with views of development tied to classical and free-market economics. With the economic growth of India and some East Asian economies, however, dependency theory has itself lost some of its former influence. It is more widely accepted in disciplines such as history and anthropologyTemplate:Fact. It also underpins some NGO campaigns, such as Make Poverty History and the Fair Trade movement.

Dependency was said to be created with the industrial revolution and the expansion of European empires around the world, due to their superior military power and accumulated wealth. Some argue that before this expansion, the exploitation was internal, with the major economic centres dominating the rest of the country (for example: Southeast England dominating Britain, or the Northeast United States dominating the South and West). The establishment of global trade patterns in the nineteenth century allowed capitalism to spread globallyTemplate:Fact. The wealthy became more isolated from the poor, because they gained disproportionately from imperialistic practicesTemplate:Fact. This minimized the dangers of domestic peasant revolts and rebellions by the poorTemplate:Fact. Rather than turn on their oppressors as in the American Civil War or in communist revolutions, the poor could no longer reach the wealthy and thus the less developed nations became engulfed in regular civil warsTemplate:Fact. Once the imperialist rich nations established formal control, it could not be easily removedTemplate:Fact. This control ensures that all profits in less developed countries are remitted to the developed nationsTemplate:Fact, preventing domestic reinvestment, causing capital flight and thus hindering growthTemplate:Fact.

[編輯] Quantitative dependency theory and the globalization of the dependency argument

Dependency authors explain backwardness and stagnation by the insertion of these countries as dependents in the world economy. Starting with the writings of Perroux, Prebisch and Rothschild in the 1930s, leading spokespersons for dependency theory (Herb Addo, Paul A. Baran, Walden Bello, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Armando Cordova, Ernest Feder, Andre Gunder Frank, Pablo Gonzales Casanova, Keith Griffin, Kunibert Raffer, Paul Israel Singer, Osvaldo Sunkel, et al.) stressed the unequal and socially imbalanced nature of development in regions that are highly dependent on investment from the highly developed countries. Short-term spurts of growth notwithstanding, long-term growth will be imbalanced and unequalTemplate:Fact, and will tend towards high negative current account balancesTemplate:Fact. Many of these authors focused their attention on Latin America; their leading spokesperson in the Islamic world is the Egyptian economist Samir Amin.

Later world systems theory - that started with the writings of the Austro-Hungarian socialist Karl Polanyi after the First World War - was offered as support and expansion of dependency arguments. Capitalism in the periphery, like in the center, is characterized by strong cyclical fluctuationsTemplate:Fact, and there are centers, semi-peripheries and peripheries. The rise of one group of semi-peripheries tends to be at the cost of another group, but the unequal structure of the world economy based on unequal exchange tends to remain stableTemplate:Fact

Dependency and world system theory generally hold that poverty and backwardness in poor countries - like the Islamic world - are caused by the peripheral position that these nations hold in the international division of labor. Ever since the capitalist world system evolved, there is a stark distinction between the nations of the center and the nations of the peripheryTemplate:Fact. Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, when he was still a social scientist, summarized the quantifiable essence of dependency theories as follows:

• there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery;

• this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and between them and the centers;

• this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery;

• this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations;

• these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance (Cardoso, 1979).

The large number of empirical studies on peripheral capitalism and development on a world level in the B-phase of the Kondratieff cycle from 1965 onwards go back, in a way, to the classic essay published by Johan Galtung in the Journal of Peace Research (Galtung, 1971). For Galtung, income inequality, and hence, relative poverty in the nations of the world system is linked to trade partner concentration of the peripheral country and a trade structure that relies on the exports of raw materials and the imports of finished products. Volker Bornschier, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and their school later reformulated the argument: not only income inequality, but also long term economic growth are being negatively determined by dependency from transnational capital, to be measured by a weighted share of transnational investment penetration per the economic and demographic size of a nation. Later essays extended the argument to other indicators of human well-being, the environment as well as democratic stability. Macroquantitative analyses modeled around the dependency/world system school have generally been consistent with dependency arguments, showing that powerful influences cause inequality and external imbalances in the peripheryTemplate:Fact.

There has been a tendency in more recent cross-national research to focus not only on such variables as economic growth, income inequality and a few other indicators of social well-being, but to interpret "well-being" more widely to include also democracy, the environment, gender inequality and human development. Research results were published in the leading peer-reviewed international journals of the social sciences, like the American Sociological Review, the American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces and many others. In a recent review on the subject, Tausch (2006) counted far more than 240 quantitative articles in major peer-reviewed journals on "dependency" and "development".

What are the negative social and ecological consequences of the dependent insertion into the world economy on a global scale and in the Southern and Southeastern neighborhood of Europe?

A rising degree of monopolization in the leading center countries over timeTemplate:Fact determines that, in order to keep the share of wages at least constant, a rising exploitation of the raw material producers sets in to offset the balanceTemplate:Fact. A great deal of evidence has been adduced to support dependency theoryTemplate:Fact. However, it would be wrong to portray dependency simply in terms of MNC penetration, and to neglect other aspects of that relationship. Such authors as Paul Israel Singer and Arno Tausch have put emphasis on the resource balance as an indicator of the weight of foreign saving. Other formulations of dependency insisted on unequal exchange which, according to one such formulation, hampers development (i.e. double factorial terms of trade of the respective country are < 1.0; see Raffer, 1987, Amin, 1975, Kohler/Tausch, 2002).

Labor in the export sectors of the periphery is being exploitedTemplate:Fact, while monopolistic structures of international trade let the centers profit from the high prices of their exports to the world markets in comparison to their labor productivityTemplate:Fact.

Neo-dependency and world system schools (see Tausch and Prager, 1993) fear in addition that the most recent tendencies of world capitalism will strongly work against high female employment and create female unemployment, and they would especially expect two hypotheses to hold:

(i) that transnational capital marginalizes female labor power

(ii) that the dynamics of growth turn away from those countries, where women still have a strong position on the labor market.

Countries as far apart as Africa and Asia, just as Poland from 1795 - 1918, did not constitute national states during the formative Industrial Revolution. Their economies were geared to the needs of colonial powers. The structural heterogeneity between the different economic sectors on the one hand and the 'modern', export oriented sector, the medium sector and the 'traditional sector' in agriculture, industry and services, became the main reason for the unequal income distribution in the countries of the periphery. Colonial trade, foreign investment in the 19th Century, import substitution in the first half of the 20th Century, and the new international division of labor that we observe from the middle of the 1960s onwards did not really change the structures of inequality in the world systemTemplate:Fact. While mass demand and agricultural structures (Elsenhans, 1983) were responsible for the transition from the tributary mode of production in Western Europe to capitalism from the Long 16th Century onwards, periphery capitalism was and is characterized by the following main tendencies (Amin, 1973 - 1997):

1. regression in both agriculture and small scale industry characterizes the period after the onslaught of foreign domination and colonialism

2. unequal international specialization of the periphery leads to the concentration of activities in export oriented agriculture and or mining. Some industrialization of the periphery is possible under the condition of low wages, which, together with rising productivity, determine that unequal exchange sets in (double factorial terms of trade < 1.0; see Raffer, 1987 )

3. these structures determine in the long run a rapidly growing tertiary sector with hidden unemployment and the rising importance of rent in the overall social and economic system

4. the development blocks of peripheral capitalism (chronic current account balance deficits, re-exported profits of foreign investments, deficient business cycles of the periphery that provide important markets for the centers during world economic upswings)

5. structural imbalances in the political and social relationships, inter alia a strong 'compradore' element and the rising importance of state capitalism and an indebted state class

For this reason, most concept of dependence at least includes three dimensions:

• unequal exchange or low comparative price levels, which are measured as the ratio between GDP at purchasing power parity rates and GDP at international exchange rates
• MNC penetration
• the resource balance.

The analysis of development patterns in the 1990s and beyond is complicated by the fact that capitalism develops not smoothly, but with very strong and self-repeating ups and downs, called cycles. Relevant results are given in studies by Joshua Goldstein, Volker Bornschier, and Luigi Scandella.

Cyclical fluctuations have also a profound effect on cross-national comparisons of economic growth and societal development in the medium and long run. What could have been spectacular long-run growth, may in the end turn out to be just a short run cyclical spurt after a long recession. Cycle time plays an important role. Giovanni Arrighi believed that the logic of accumulation on a world scale shifts along time, and that we again witness during the 1980s and beyond a deregulated phase of world capitalism with a logic, characterized - in contrast to earlier regulatory cycles - by the dominance of financial capital.

At this stage, the role of unequal exchange in the entire relationship of dependency cannot be underestimated. Unequal exchange is given, if double factorial terms of trade of the respective country are < 1.0 (Raffer, 1987, Amin, 1975). Labor in the export sectors of the periphery is being exploited, while monopolistic structures of international trade let the centers profit from the high prices of their exports to the world markets in comparison to their labor productivity. Since double factorial terms of trade are simply net barter terms of trade weighted by productivities (F) of X, exports, and M, imports, the formula

(1) ((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = 1

denotes the conditions of ‘equal’ exchange as opposed to unequal exchange:

(2) ((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = < 1.0

while nations with

(3) ((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = > 1.0

are the countries that benefited from unequal exchange.

Losses or gains from unequal transfer are calculated as the difference between a "fair value" of exports/imports and the "actual (unfair) value" of exports/imports. The estimation formula according to Kohler/Tausch is:

(4) T = d*X - X

where

(5) d = the exchange rate deviation index (also designated as "ERD" or “ERDI” in the literature)

X = the volume of exports from a low- or middle-income country to high-income countries (valued at the actual exchange rate)

T = the unrecorded transfer of value (gain or loss) resulting from unequal transfer

The transfer of value from the peripheries to the center, according to the reasoning put forward by Gernot Kohler, is gigantic, and amounts to 24% of Periphery GDP in 1995. (Number of countries: OECD N=19 (1965) and N=22 (1995); NON-OECD N=88 (1965) and N=97 (1995)) [See Kohler/Tausch, 2002]

[編輯] Implications

While there are many different and conflicting ideas on how developing countries can alleviate the effects of the world system, several of the following protectionist/nationalist practices were adopted at one time or another by such countries:

• Promotion of domestic industry and manufactured goods. By imposing subsidies to protect domestic industries, poor countries can be enabled to sell their own products rather than simply exporting raw materials.
• Import limitations. By limiting the importation of luxury goods and manufactured goods that can be produced within the country, the country can reduce its loss of capital and resources.
• Forbidding foreign investment. Some governments took steps to keep foreign companies and individuals from owning or operating property that draws on the resources of the country.
• Nationalization. Some governments have forcibly taken over foreign-owned companies on behalf of the state, in order to keep profits within the country.

[編輯] Criticism by Neo-liberal Economists

Dependency theory has been criticized by free-market economists such as Peter Bauer and Martin Wolf, who believe that the promulgation of the theory leads to:

• Corruption. Free-market economists hold that state-owned companies have higher rates of corruption than privately owned companies.
• Lack of competition. By subsidizing in-country industries and preventing outside imports, these companies may have less incentive to improve their products, to try to become more efficient in their processes, to please customers, or to research new innovations.
• Sustainability. Reliance of industries on government support may not be sustainable for very long, particularly in poorer countries and countries which largely budget out of foreign aid.
• Domestic opportunity costs. Subsidies on domestic industries come out of state coffers and therefore represent money not spent in other ways, like development of domestic infrastructure, seed capital or need-based social welfare programs. At the same time, the higher prices caused by tariffs and restrictions on imports require the people either to forgo these goods altogether or buy them at higher prices, forgoing other goods.

Proponents of dependency theory claim that the theory of comparative advantage breaks down when capital (including both physical capital, like machines, as well as financial capital) is highly mobile, as it is under the conditions of globalization. For this reason, it is claimed that dependency theory can offer new insights into a world of highly mobile multinational corporations.

This has been countered by the argument that the conditions of globalization actually make comparative advantage more sound. Two of the key assumptions of comparative advantage - zero transportation costs and zero communication cost - are arguably more realistic in the contemporary global marketplace than in earlier times. While zero communication costs are supported by the internet, it would appear, however, that the theory of the tendency to zero transport costs is dependent on the costs of energy. Furthermore, the assumptions of free trade models only ever includes two factors of production - namely the globalisation of capital and resources, but not labour. Currently the free movement of labour is being restricted world-wide with various forms of immigration control.

Market economists cite a number of examples in their arguments against dependency theory. The improvement of India's economy after it moved from state-controlled business to open trade is one of the most often cited (see also economy of India, Commanding Heights). India's example seems to contradict dependency theorists' claims concerning comparative advantage and mobility, as much as its economic growth originated from movements such as outsourcing - one of the most mobile forms of capital transfer. However, South Korea was able to rise out of poverty while using many tenets which Dependency theory advisesTemplate:Fact.

Free market theorists see dependency theorists' complaints as legitimate, but their policy prescriptions as self-fulfilling prophecies, in that the policies only aggravate the disparity between the developed nations and the underdeveloped countries.

[編輯] Towards a Neo-classical/Dependency Theory Synthesis?

Future interesting debates could touch upon the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect, especially in the new member countries of the European Union in Eastern Europe, and the problem of the asymmetrical reputation of currencies.

Established economics teaches us that for income gaps to be bridged, a process of convergence sets in that was described by Bela Balassa and Paul Samuelson, independently from each other, more than 4 decades ago, and which is called ever since the Balassa-Samuelson effect. For dependency theory, this effect is as important as for standard economics. Components of, say, electricity plants in rich and poor countries will be traded on the world market at about the same, high world market prices, while a haircut in a rich country will be much more expensive than a haircut in a poor country. For economists, these huge differences of price levels in the non-tradable sectors are usually interpreted as the real reason of the welfare differences between the rich and the poor countries. Under these conditions, Balassa and Samuelson observed, the poor country has one main possibility: raising the level of wages in the non-tradable sector. Since a large part of the non-tradables depend in one way or the other on the government (social services etc.), a rising budget deficit will be one of the main negative consequences of the catching-up process. The real appreciation of the currency of the poor country will indeed take place, but the real appreciation of the currency will be confronted by a general macro-economic constraint in the economy, i.e. the worsening budget situation.

This Keynesian observation by Balassa and Samuelson (that catching up is possible, but at the price of a rising budget deficit in the periphery and semi-periphery country) is of course familiar to the economics departments of Central Banks all over the world. The Balassa/Samuelson effect is often debated today, in the context of the Euro-accession of the new EU-member countries.

It is surprising that European policymaking has completely changed the roadmaps of what should be achieved under the Balassa-Samuelson effect. By demanding that EU member states have a low international price level (as purportedly indicated by the Lisbon structural indicators) and hence also low price levels in the non-tradable sectors, European economic policy completely reverses Balassa/Samuelson.

Largely unnoticed in the European political debate, this constitutes a 180 degree reversal of the direction of European economic policy since the postwar period in the name of “economic reform” (low comparative price levels, the Eurostat Lisbon list of indicators informs us, are an indicator of “economic reform”). The Keynesian argument, proposed by Balassa and Samuelson, corresponded to the basic consensus of the structuralist and mildly state interventionist economic policies of the early postwar years. Balassa/Samuelson always implied that the periphery and semi-periphery country will catch up with richer regions, and will become a high-price country itself one day.

One of the political absurdities of the price level indicator is that countries suffering from currency crises are performing well on the price level indicator, while countries with a sound real appreciation of their currency – in the tradition of Balassa/Samuelson – are performing badly according to Eurostat.

A country, following the European Commission’s price reform strategy, is a country with a low international price level. Thus, the new member countries of the EU are being pushed into the direction of countries, suffering from unequal exchange and low comparative price levels.

Structuralist economists, like Stanford Professor emeritus Pan Yotopoulos, usually warn the weaker countries of the periphery that

“Currency substitution represents an asymmetric demand from Mexicans to hold dollars as a store of value, a demand that is not reciprocated by Americans holding pesos as a hedge against the devaluation of the dollar!” (Yotopoulos and Sawada, 2005)

Their argument, which they established in a 1999 paper, refined in their 2005 analysis, was the so-called Y-Proposition, but this Y-position is very relevant today:

“in free currency markets hard currencies fluctuate, while soft currencies depreciate systematically (...) The alternative scenario deprives devaluation of any of its remedial properties that in the conventional view lead to a process of stable interactions and equilibrium....”

Their argument might be relevant for the continuing low international price level of countries like Turkey after the currency crisis of recent years. They think that the basic problem of international currency markets is asymmetric reputation. This process of asymmetric reputation of the periphery deepens the cycle of underdevelopment:

“Mexico cannot service its foreign debt from the proceeds of producing nontradables. These are traded in pesos. It has instead to shift resources away from the nontradable sector to produce tradable output in order to procure the dollars for servicing the debt (...) The process (...) can create a negative feedback loop that leads to resource misallocation in soft-currency countries (...) This shift of resources represents misallocation and produces inefficiency and output losses (...) Distortions inherent in free currency markets lead to a systematic devaluation of soft currencies – to „high“ nominal exchange rates. Devaluation of the exchange rate means increasing prices of tradables and leads to increased exports. But not all exports are a bargain to produce compared to the alternative of producing nontradables (...) Countries graduate from being exporters of sugar and copra to exporting their teak forests, and on to systematically exporting nurses and doctors, while they remain underdeveloped all the same. If this happens, it may represent competitive devaluation trade as opposed to comparative advantage trade.“

The authors further explain their ideas by an econometric analysis of economic growth rates in 62 countries from 1970 onwards that shows how this process of competitive devaluation trade leads to stagnation. They also present an economic model in the tradition of Paul Krugman that shows how currency substitution triggers financial crises. In their 2005 paper, the authors show the relevance of their theories with time series data from 153 countries. Thus, if they are correct, a high ratio between purchasing power and GDP at exchange rates, i.e. an under-valued currency, will lead to stagnation. The countries with the strongest currencies, like Denmark, the UK, Sweden, are typical centers of the capitalist world economy with a favorable ratio of tradables to non-tradables, while the countries with a Eurostat “good” low price level, like Turkey, are countries with an unfavorable relation between tradables and non-tradables, suffering from what neo-Marxists like to call “unequal transfer” or “unequal exchange” (price reform/low international price level).

According to this argument, countries like Poland should always remain as soft currency zones; and, to keep international price levels low, the real appreciation of their currencies against the Euro (as evident in the Polish Zloty since 2004) should be stopped or even reversed.

[編輯] Literature

The voluminous literature on the subject is surveyed and documented in (among others):

Amin S. (1976), 'Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism' New York: Monthly Review Press.

Amin S. (1994c), 'Re-reading the postwar period: an intellectual itinerary' Translated by Michael Wolfers. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Amin S. (1997b), 'Die Zukunft des Weltsystems. Herausforderungen der Globalisierung. Herausgegeben und aus dem Franzoesischen uebersetzt von Joachim Wilke' Hamburg: VSA.

Bornschier V. (1976), 'Wachstum, Konzentration und Multinationalisierung von Industrieunternehmen' Frauenfeld and Stuttgart: Huber.

Bornschier V. (1996), 'Western society in transition' New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.

Bornschier V. and Chase - Dunn Ch. K (1985), 'Transnational Corporations and Underdevelopment' N.Y., N.Y.: Praeger.

Köhler G. and Tausch A. (2002) Global Keynesianism: Unequal exchange and global exploitation. Huntington NY, Nova Science.

Sunkel O. (1966), 'The Structural Background of Development Problems in Latin America' Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 97, 1: pp. 22 ff.

Sunkel O. (1973), 'El subdesarrollo latinoamericano y la teoria del desarrollo' Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 6a edicion.

Tausch A. (1993, with Fred Prager as co-author), 'Towards a Socio - Liberal Theory of World Development' Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press.

Tausch A. and Peter Herrmann (2002) Globalization and European Integration. Huntington NY, Nova Science.

Yotopoulos P. and Sawada Y. (2005), ‘Exchange Rate Misalignment: A New test of Long-Run PPP Based on Cross-Country Data’ CIRJE Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-318, February 2005, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, available at: http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/dp/2005/2005cf318.pdf

[編輯] See also

• World-systems theory
• Marxist International Relations theory

[編輯] Links

• Globalresearch.ca
• Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales
• [http://www.eclac.org/default.asp?idioma=IN ECLAC/CEPAL Santiago
• IPRD London
• Revista Entelequia
• The World Revolution
• University of Texas Inequality Project

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[編輯] 列寧與帝國主義

與馬克思所處的時代相比，在20世紀初期，資本主義經濟發生了本質的變化，資本主義在技術上已經遠先進於 馬克思所處的時代；同時，資本主義在地理範圍上也不局限於馬克思時代的歐洲，準確地說是西歐，而是變成了 一種全球性的經濟；在工業組織上，資本主義也由馬克司時代的主要是競爭性的小工業公司發展到受大銀行控 制的工業集團；資本主義開始由自由競爭的資本主義向壟斷的資本主義過渡。就這一時代的資本主義而言，出 現了如下五個新的特徵：

１．壟斷組織的出現

在列寧看來，20世紀初壟斷資本主義或資本主義的壟斷姓住要有如下四種形式：第一，壟斷是從發展到極高階 段的生產集中成長起來的。這就是資本家的壟斷同盟卡特爾、辛迪加、托拉斯。第二，壟斷加緊了對最重要的 原料來源的掠奪，尤其是對資本主義社會主要的、卡特爾化程度最高的工業部門，如煤炭工業和鋼鐵工業所需 要的原料來源的掠奪。第三，壟斷是從銀行成長起來的。銀行已經由普遍的中介企業變成了金融資本的壟斷者。 第四，壟斷是從殖民政策成長起來的。在殖民主義政策的無數舊的動機以外，金融資本又增加了爭奪原料來源、 爭奪資本輸出、爭奪勢力範圍以及爭奪一般經濟領土等等的動機。

２．金融寡頭的形成

在馬克思的時代，對於銀行在一個社會的經濟結後中的作用，馬克思在其著作《資本論》中只是認為，“銀行造 成了社會範圍的公共薄記和生產資料的公共分配的形式，但只是形式而已”。那麼，到了列寧時代，銀行的作用 發生了很大的變化，用列寧自己的分析就是，“銀行原先的主要業務是在支付中起中介作用。這樣一來，銀行就 把不活動的貨幣資本，把所有一切貨幣收入集合起來交給資本家階級支配，隨著銀行業的發展及其集中於少數幾 個機構，銀行就由普通的中介人變為萬能的壟斷者，她們支配著所有資本家和小業主的幾乎全部的貨幣資本，以 及本國和許多國家的大部分生產資料和原料來源。許許多多普通的中介人變為極少數壟斷者，這就是資本主義發 展成為資本帝國主義的基本過程之一”。

銀行作用的加強加速了資本的集中和壟斷組織的形成，並日益與工業資本結合起來，形成了金融資本和金融寡頭。 用列寧自己的話來說就是：“一方面是銀行資本和工業資本日益融合起來，......日益混合生長了；另一方面是 銀行發展成為具有真正‘萬能的性質’ 的機構。”“而集中在少數人手裡並且享有實際壟斷權的金融資本，由於 創辦企業、發行有價證卷、辦理公債等等而獲得大量的、愈來愈多的利潤，鞏固了金融寡頭的統治，替壟斷者向整 個社會徵收貢稅。” 金融資本和工業資本的日益結合形成了資本主義的新的特徵，不但加劇了國內經濟的不平衡， 而且更加劇了資本主義國家之間的不平衡。“資本資億的一般特性，就是資本的占有同資本在生產中的運用相分 離，貨幣資本同工業資本或生產資本想分離，全靠貨幣資本的收入維生的食利者同企業家和其他一切直接參與運用 資本的人相分離。帝國主義或金融資本的統治，是資本主義的最高階段，這種分離達到了極大的程度。金融資本對 其他一切行事的資本的優勢，表明食利者和金融寡頭占有統治地位，表明少數拥有金融‘實力’ 的國家比其餘一切 國家都突出。” 一句話，20世紀事從舊資本主義進到新資本主義，從一般資本統治進到金融資本統治的轉折點。

３.資本的輸出

資本輸出是壟斷占統治地位的最新資本主義的特徵，這與以前以商品輸出為特徵的自由競爭占完全統治地位的舊資 本主義完全不同。 經過自由競爭時期的資本積蓄，到20世紀初期，在發達的資本主義國家，出現了新的資本壟斷狀況，不但所有資 本主義發達的國家都有了資本家的壟斷同盟，而且少數積蓄了大量資本的最富的國家在資本主義體系中處於壟斷地位 。在先進國家裡出現了大量的“過剩資本”。這樣，就在世界範圍內出現了資本輸出的可能性和必要性。就可能性而 言，由於壟斷組織的出現和金融資本的形成，世界的財富愈來愈集中於少數幾個發達國家，這就使得大多數國家仍然 處於落後狀態，但在這落後的國家裡，地價比較賤，工資很低，原料也便宜；同時，由於16世紀以來西歐國家在世 界範圍內實行殖民主義的流通範圍之內，主要的鐵路線已經建成或者開始新建，發展工業的起碼條件也有保證等 等，所以，在落後的國家進行投資，利潤確實很高。就必要性而言，由於在少數發達國家形成的剩餘資本，在本國 有利可圖的場所不夠了，國內的市場已經成熟過度了，這樣在國內的利潤就很低，結果自然是，將過剩的資本輸出到 落後的國家去，以此提高利潤。關於這一點，我們可以從幾個發達國家在國外的投資得以發現，英國由於在歐洲之外 有大量的殖民地，所以他的資本輸出與殖民地有大量的聯系。法國誰然集中於歐洲，但卻採取的事借貸資本的形式而 不是工業投資。

國外投資在世界各洲分布的大概情形（1910年左右） （單位：十億馬克）

英國 法國 德國 共計 歐洲………………… 4 23 18 45

美洲………………… 37 4 10 51

亞洲、非洲、奧洲… 29 8 7 44

總計………………… 70 35 35 140

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資料來源:《列寧選集》(第二卷)，人民出版社1972年版，第785頁

４．資本家同盟割世界

資本主義發展到帝國主義階段的另一個特徵就是，資本家同盟對世界進行分割。資本家同盟首先分隔了國內市場， 把本國的生產完全霸占在自己的手裡。同時，在資本主義發展到帝國主義階段，隨著資本注意的擴展和殖民地勢 力範圍的擴張，國內市場和國際市場之間的關係更為密切，特別是由於資本的輸出，壟斷同盟就變成了一種世界 性的，形成了國際卡特爾。比如，20世紀初，世界電力工業主要被美國的“通用電氣公司”和德國的“電氣總公 司” 所壟斷，以至於世界上沒有一個完全不依賴它們的電力公司。煤油工業也是如此。

５．列強瓜分世界

帝國主義階段的最後一個特徵是，世界第一次被分割完畢，世界被分割完畢是這個時期的特點。這個特點與兩個 事實密切相關，一個是殖民政策的加強，一個是爭奪殖民地的鬥爭尖銳化，而這兩個事實是金融資本十逮的必然 結果。列寧對金融資本在分割世界中所起的作用做了細致的分析： 對於金融資本來說，不僅已經發現的原料來源，而且可能發現的原料來源，都是有意義的，因為現代技術的發展 異常迅速，今天無用的土地，要是明天發明了新的方法，或是投入了大量的資本，就會變成有用的土地......。 因此，金融資本必然力圖擴大經濟領土，甚至一般領土。托拉斯估計到將來“可能獲得的” （而不是現有的）利 潤，估計到將來壟斷的結果，把自己的財產按高一兩倍的估價資本化；同樣，金融資本也估計到可能獲得的原料 來源，惟恐在爭奪世界上尚未分割的最後幾塊土地或重新分割已經分割了的一些土地的瘋狂鬥爭中落後於他人， 總想盡量奪取更多的土地，不管這是一些什麼樣的土地，不管這些土地在什麼地方，也不管採取什麼手段。 帝國主義的這些特徵改變了資本主義國際體系中的政治關係，這突出表現在如下幾個方面： （１） 殖民政策的加強。壟斷組織的出現和金融資本的形成不是削弱了世界經濟內部的不平衡和矛盾，而是加 劇了這種不平衡和矛盾。這種不平衡和矛盾不全體現在經濟方面，而且也體現在政治方面，這使得發達的資本主 義國家對發展中國家或殖民地國家的經濟剝削和政治壓迫日益加強。“最新資本主義時代像我們表明，資本家同 盟在從經濟上分割世界的基礎上形成了一定的關係，與此同時、與此有聯繫的是，各個政治同盟、各個國家在叢 領土上分割世界、爭奪殖民地、‘爭奪經濟領土’ 的基礎上也形成了一定的關係。” （２） 壟斷組織的出現和金融資本的形成，使得世界範圍內的階級分化日趨突出。如果說，在馬克思的時代， 自由競爭的資本主義史得階級分化主要在國內日益加強，而在帝國主義時代，階級分化日趨世界化。“從帝國主 義國家移往國外的人口逐漸減少，從比較落後的、工資比較低的國家移入帝國主義國家的人口（流入的工人和移民） 卻逐漸增加，這也是與上述種種現象有關的帝國主義特點之一。” （３） 帝國主義是過渡的資本主義。與馬克思關於資北主義必然滅亡的斷言相同，列寧將這種斷言運用到資本 主義的最高階段---帝國主義的未來上。列寧認為，帝國主義的這種前途是由帝國主義的經濟實質決定的。“壟斷 資本主義使資本主義的一切矛盾尖銳到什麼程度，這是大家都知道的。只要指出物價高漲和卡特爾的壓迫就夠了。 這種矛盾的尖銳化，是從世界金融資本取得最終勝利開始的這一過渡歷史時期的最強大的動力。”

資料來源：《國際政治經濟學-----理論范式與現實經驗研究》 王正毅 張岩貴 著 (2004年)

歐研所 文青

[編輯] 馬克思主義政治經濟學

(亞太所 蔡承哲)

馬克思主義政治經濟學的基本觀點主要包括在馬克思的重要著作《資本論》中，馬克思研究了資本主義經濟學的理論和英國歷年的經濟統計資料，對資本主義經濟學理論進行了分析和批判。馬克思提出了剩餘價值理論，認為勞動的付出沒有得到同樣的回報，剩餘價值被沒有付出勞動的“資本”所剝削。生產資料的私人占有和產品的社會化必然會導致產生周期性的經濟危機，解決的辦法只有實行計劃經濟。

歷史上沒有一個經濟學家可以提出一貼萬應靈藥，人類對經濟規律的理解還只是處於一種大致定性的狀態，馬克思發現了經濟規律中的一個重要方面，在經濟學領域作出了重大的貢獻。

在西方國家，學術界習慣區分馬克思主義經濟學與作為政治意識形態的馬克思主義；馬克思主義經濟學被視為新古典主義經濟學之外的一種體系被人們研究，未必牽涉無產階級革命的必然性，或計劃經濟與自由市場孰優孰劣的問題。

中國大陸大學中所教授的“政治經濟學”其實就是“馬克思主義政治經濟學”。

[編輯] 基本觀念

馬克思的主要經濟學著作是《資本論：政治經濟學批判》（德文：Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie），共三冊，馬克思在世時只出版第一冊，所餘由恩格斯整理出版。馬克思早期曾出版《政治經濟學批判》一書，其內容大半被後來的《資本論》吸納。此外，馬克思準備《資本論》時的草稿後來也以《政治經濟學批判大綱》（德文：Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie）為名出版，對於研究馬克思的方法論具有相當價值。

馬克思對資本主義的分析始於對商品的分析，《資本論》開頭第一句話就是

“ 資本主義生產方式占統治地位的社會的財富，表現為“龐大的商品堆積”，單個的商品表現為這種財富的元素形式。因此，我們的研究就從分析商品開始。 ”

簡言之，根據勞動價值學說，商品的價值決定於其中凝結的社會必要勞動時間。此外商品也具有使用價值及交換價值，詳如後述。然而資本家購買的是工人的勞動力，而非工人實際付出的勞動量，是以商品中凝結的價值分成三份：

生產資料的價值 資本家支付的勞動價值 資本家未支付的勞動價值 最後一項稱為剩餘價值。馬克思認為市場遮蓋了資本主義生產模式下的社會關係，這種顛倒被他稱作商品拜物教。

[編輯] 使用價值

使用價值是一切商品都具有的共同屬性之一。任何物品要想成為商品都必須具有可供人類使用的價值；反之，毫無使用價值的物品是不會成為商品的。使用價值是物品的自然屬性。

馬克思主義政治經濟學認為，使用價值是由具體勞動創造的，並且具有質的不可比較性。比如我們不能說橡膠和香蕉哪一個使用價值更多。使用價值是價值的物質基礎，和價值一起，構成了商品二重性。

[編輯] 勞動二重性

生產商品的勞動分為具體勞動和抽象勞動二重屬性。具體勞動和抽象勞動是同一勞動的兩個方面，具體勞動創造商品的使用價值，抽象勞動創造商品的價值。正是由於抽象勞動這種同質的一般人類勞動在商品中的凝結，才形成了商品的價值，構成商品交換的基礎。

具體勞動： 抽象勞動的對稱。是在一定的勞動目的，操作方法，勞動對象，勞動手段和勞動結果下進行的勞動。

抽象勞動：具體勞動的對稱。撇開勞動具體形式的一般無差別的人類生理學上的勞動耗費。

[編輯] 勞動對象

勞動對象指勞動本身所對應的客體，比如耕作的土地，紡織的棉花等。包括兩大類。一是自然界的物質，即未經人類加工過的自然物。一是人類勞動加工過的，用做原材料的產品。

[編輯] 馬克思與古典經濟學

馬克思的經濟學說以當時最著名的英國政治經濟學家為起點，其中包括了亞當·斯密、托馬斯·羅伯特·馬爾薩斯與大衛·李嘉圖。

斯密在《國富論》中主張市場經濟最重要的特徵是它容許生產力快速增長。斯密認為市場的茁壯刺激了分工，而這又反過來加強生產力。馬克思在這方面與斯密持同樣觀點。在《剩餘價值理論》中，馬克思說：「我們看到亞當·斯密在對剩餘價值及資本的分析上超越了重農主義……。根據他們的看法，只有一種特殊的勞動－農業勞動－創造剩餘價值。但是對於亞當·斯密，展現的卻是一般社會勞動－無論用途為何－的價值，這只是必要勞動的量。無論剩餘價值採取利潤、地租或利息的次級形式，都不外是這種勞動的一部分，由勞動物質條件的持有者在與活的勞動相交換時挪用。」

馬爾薩斯在《人口學原理》中主張人口增長是工資保持在最低生活所需的主因。馬克思發展了另一套工資理論。馬爾薩斯的理論是非歷史的，他僅假設了一種抽象的、放諸四海皆準的人口原理；馬克思則給出了資本主義多餘人口如何決定工資的理論，這些多餘人口的起因是經濟的，而非生物學的（馬爾薩斯的理論）。這套理論通常被稱為馬克思的產業後備軍理論。

李嘉圖發展了資本主義內部的分配理論，亦即關於社會的產出如何在各階級間分配的理論。這套理論的成熟形式存在於他的名著《政治經濟學及賦稅原理》：基於勞動價值理論，產品的價值等於其中凝結的勞動。而利潤源自社會的產出，工資與利潤成負相關──利潤的增加以工資降低為代價。馬克思在《資本論》中的形式分析泰半建基於李嘉圖的理論。

[編輯] 奧地利學派的觀點

奧地利經濟學派的成員歐根·博姆-巴維克從另一方面提出批判。他主張《資本論》第一卷的價值理論與第三捲第九章的價格理論衝突，無法解釋在市場競爭的環境下，商品的價值如何轉變為平均價格。

奧地利經濟學派是第一群有系統地挑戰馬克思經濟學的學者，這一部份是受到針對經濟歷史學派的方法學論戰影響，而奧地利經濟學派關心的貨幣、資本及景氣循環等問題也與《資本論》重疊。

[編輯] 當前發展

馬克思主義經濟學並非出自馬克思一人之手。在馬克思過世後，許多人接手發展這套體系。在非主流經濟學的討論中，通常會納入馬克思主義經濟學。

在中國之外，歐美許多大學均有開設馬克思主義經濟學的課程，例如美國的麻州大學愛默斯特分校、麻州大學波士頓分校、河濱加州大學、緬因大學、新學院、密蘇里州大學堪薩斯城分校、科羅拉多州大學、猶他大學；英國的利茲大學、曼徹斯特大學、倫敦大學亞非研究院，荷蘭的馬斯特裡赫特大學與德國的不萊梅大學等[10]。

專門探討馬克思主義經濟學的西方期刊包括有 Capital and Class, Historical Materialism, 《每月評論》（Monthly Review）與 Rethinking Marxism 等等。

在日本，馬克思主義經濟學的研究目前分成四個學派：正統派、宇野學派、市民社會派與數理化馬克思經濟學派。

[編輯] 全球主義

全球主義伴隨著全球化出現，亦可稱為「新理想主義」(neo-idealism)，回顧一次大戰後所出現的「理想主義」(idealism)，其主要觀點認為國際秩序必須制度 化，應成立一國際組織來維持國際體系的運作，強調利益和諧勝過利益衝突所帶來的衝擊，因此，理想主義成為全球主義的思想淵源。二次大戰後，國際社會出 現兩極對立，國際組織大量興起、全球化的浪潮、國際經濟互動緊密等等因素，加速全球主義的發展。

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[編輯] 世界體系理論 (World-systems theory WIKI版)

『亞太所 朱益賢』

World system approach is a post-Marxist international relations-approach based in part on the works of Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein.

Post-Marxist world-system theory is much based on the works of Karl Marx, being one of several applications of Marxism to international relations. One of the roots of the theory is imperialism, which for many Marxists in the 20th century was "the highest stage of capitalism", a term coined by Vladimir Lenin, who also used the terms periphery and core as a means to analyse world politics and economy. However, in recent years the non-Marxist interpretations of the world-system approach have grown in their strength rather significantly.

Immanuel Wallerstein describes our world system as characterized by mechanisms, which bring about a redistribution of resources from the periphery to the core. In his terminology, the core is the developed, industrialized, democratic part of the world, which economically exploits the poor, raw materials-exporting, less developed countries - the periphery, through the means of the market.These are the world-system's spatial features. Wallerstein locates the origin of the modern world-system in 16th century Western Europe and defines:

"A world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others. One can define its structures as being at different times strong or weak in terms of the internal logic of its functioning."<ref>Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) the Modern World-System, New York, Academic Press, pp. 347-57.</ref>

Apart of these, Wallerstein defines four temporal features of that. Cyclical rhythms represent the short-term fluctuation of economy, while secular trends mean deeper long run tendencies, such as general economic growth or decline. In the theory the term contradiction means a general controversy in the system, usually concerning some short-run vs. long run trade-offs. For example the problem of underconsumption, wherein the drive-down of wages increases the profit for the capitalists on the short-run, but considering the long run, the decreasing of wages may have a crucially harmful effect by reducing the demand for the product. The last temporal feature is the crisis: a crisis occurs, if a constellation of circumstances brings about the losing of the system's structure, which also means the end of the system.

But to be more exact, World-systems analysis is not a theory, but an approach to social analysis and social change developed,as already mentioned above, principally by Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Christopher K. Chase-Dunn, Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, with major contributions by Volker Bornschier, Peter Turchin, Andrey Korotayev, Janet Abu Lughod, Tom Hall, Kunibert Raffer, and others. It should be noted that World-systems analysis is not only derived from the neo-Marxist literature on development but also from the French Annales School (especially Fernand Braudel).

[編輯] The world system perspective

Template:POV-check-section The Latin American economist Osvaldo Sunkel, a representative of dependency theory, once stated:

‘The interpretation so far advanced suggests that the international capitalist system contains an internationalized nucleus of activities, regions and social groups of varying degrees of importance in each country. These sectors share a common culture and ‘way of life’, which expresses itself through the same books, texts, films, television programs, similar fashions, similar groups of organization of family and social life, similar style of decoration of homes, similar orientations to housing, building, furniture and urban design. Despite linguistic barriers, these sectors have a far greater capacity for communication among themselves than is possible between integrated and marginal persons of the same country who speak the same language (...) Modernization implies the gradual replacement of the traditional productive structure by another of much higher capital intensiveness (...) On the one hand, the process of modernization incorporates into the new structures the individuals and groups that are apt to fit into the kind of rationality that prevails there; on the other hand, it expels the individuals and groups that have no place in the new productive structure or who lack the capacity to become adapted to it. It is important to emphasize that this process does not only prevent or limit the formation of a national entrepreneurial class, as indicated by Furtado, but also of a national middle class (...) and even a national working class. The advancement of modernization introduces, so to speak, a wedge along the area dividing the integrated from the segregated segments (...) In this process, some national entrepreneurs are incorporated as executives into the new enterprises or those absorbed by the TRANCO (i.e. transnational corporations), and others are marginalized; some professionals, forming part of the technical staff and the segment of employees are incorporated, and the rest are marginalized; part of the qualified labor supply and those that are considered fit to be upgraded are incorporated, while the remainder are marginalized.

The effects of the disintegration of each social class has important consequences for social mobility. The marginalized entrepreneur will probably add to the ranks of small or artesanal manufacture, or will abandon independent activity and become a middle class employee. The marginalized sectors of the middle class will probably form a group of frustrated lower middle class people trying to maintain middle class appearance without much possibility of upward mobility and terrorized by the danger of proletarization. The marginalized workers will surely add to the ranks of absolute marginality, where, as in the lower middle class, growing pools of resentment and frustration of considerable demographic dimension will accumulate (...) Finally, it is very probable that an international mobility will correspond to the internal mobility, particularly between the internationalized sectors (...) The process of social disintegration which has been outlined here probably also affects the social institutions which provide the bases of the different social groups and through which they express themselves. Similar tendencies to the ones described for the global society are, therefore, probably also to be found within the state, church, armed forces, political parties with a relatively wide popular base, the universities etc.’ (Sunkel, 1972: 18-42).

Dependency and world system theory hold, that poverty and backwardness in poor countries are caused by the peripheral position that these nations have in the international division of labor. Ever since the capitalist world system evolved, there is a stark distinction between the nations of the center and the nations of the periphery. Cardoso summarized the quantifiable essence of dependency theories as follows:

• there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery
• this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and between them and the centers
• this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery
• this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations
• these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of inartuculateness and structural imbalance (Cardoso, 1979)

Already the classics of political economy provided a framework of quantifiable dependency theory. Let us recall that for Marx and his labor theory of value, total product consists of constant capital, c, variable capital (labor), v, and surplus, s. Rate of surplus value, s’, the organic composition of capital, q, and the profit rate, p, are hence:

P = c + v + s

s’ = s/v

q = c/(c+v)

p = s/(c+v); hence, after some transformations:

p = s’(1-q)

Class relationships of a rising power of labor in the centers determine, that, in the end, long-term fluctuations notwithstanding, cheaper raw materials and exploitation of the periphery become one of the cornerstones of a strategy to halt the fall in the profit rate. Among others, mass migration, unequal exchange, and a new international division of labor are key elements to increase, at least temporarily, s’. Michal Kalecki adapted political economy to the age of monopolization. Let gross production be P, W are wages, M are the payments for raw materials. The monopolization factor is k. We are in a situation of less than full employment. Costs for wages, W, and raw materials M, are multiplied by a factor of k (k > 1) to arrive at prices. The gross value of production of an enterprise is thus

P = k * (W + M)

if M/W denote the terms of trade, j, between the raw material producing sector of the economy and the rest, then we arrive for the determination of the share of wages, w, by the following formula: w = 1/(1+(k-1)*(j+1))

A rising degree of monopolization in the leading center countries over time determines, that, in order to keep the share of wages at least constant, a rising exploitation of the raw material producers sets in to offset the balance.

Giovanni Arrighi proposed in his provocative analysis of the ‘Long 20th Century’ (1995) the thought that the logic of accumulation on a world-scale is governed by the ups and downs in the succession of regulation and de-regulation, starting from the Venetian (regulatory) and Genoese (deregulated) era of capitalism, followed by the Dutch (regulatory) and British (deregulated) era, and the US hegemony, which - after 1945 - was a regulatory model. From the late 1970s, however, we witness, Arrighi’s argument goes on, again the renewed rise of a deregulated model of world capitalism. The often bemoaned end of the Keynesian era has its real basis, Arrighi’s argument goes, in the shifting accumulation pattern of world capitalism. We agree with Arrighi that the rise of financial capitalism and the decline of productive capitalism are always connected to major shifts in the location of the centers of world capitalism, first from Venice to Genoa, followed by the shift from Genoa to Amsterdam, from Amsterdam to London, from London to New York, and from there on to the capitalist archipelago of East Asia of yesterday, perhaps to be followed by South Asia today (Arrighi, 1995). Arrighi also introduced the important notion, that there is a certain coexistence in the time-perspective between the ‘different logics’, so that elements of the waning and elements of the emerging order might coincide for years. Arrighi’s sequential model of world capitalism is also a historic interpretation of the old Marxist notion of financial expansion - > material expansion- >financial expansion (MCM’), and as such radically challenges the notion of ‘unchanging’ general laws of rise and decline. Following Arrighi, we postulate that regulatory strategies might have been well compatible with growth under the rise of the Venetian, Dutch, and American era, while at the time of the rise of ‘deregulation’, such deregulatory strategies and not ‘big government’ will be conducive to economic growth

[編輯] Wallerstein's formulation of the world-system approach

The most well-known version of the world-system approach has been developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein analyzes the World System as follows: "A system is defined as a unit with single division of labour and multiple cultural systems."

In Wallerstein’s 1987 publication, World-System Analysis, he disavows the term

• The 'disciplines' of modern social science are intellectually coherent groupings of subject matter that refer to discrete 'logics.' World-systems analysis calls for an unidisciplinary historical social science, and contends that the modern disciplines, products of the 19th century, are deeply flawed because they are not separate logics, as is manifest for example in the de facto overlap of analysis among scholars of the 'disciplines.'
• History is the study of events (the idiographic approach) and social science discovers universal rules of human/social behavior (the nomothetic approach). Wallerstein writes that "World-systems analysis offers the heuristic value of the via media between trans-historical generalizations and particularistic narrations...It argues that the optimal method is to pursue analysis within systemic frameworks, long enough in time and large enough in space to contain governing 'logics' which 'determine' the largest part of sequential reality, while simultaneously recognizing and taking into account that these systemic frameworks have beginnings and ends and are therefore not to be conceived of as 'eternal' phenomena."
• Modern countries or 'states' are societies, or there is a society underlying each state. World-systems analysis argues that modern states have never been societies, but are the political units of modern society's interstate system and economy. In Wallerstein's view, there have been three kinds of societies across human history: mini-systems or what anthropologists call bands, tribes, and small chiefdoms, and two types of world-systems (single state world-empires and multi-polity world-economies). World-systems are larger, and ethnically diverse. Modern society, called the "modern world-system" is of the latter type, but unique in being the first and only fully capitalist world-economy to have emerged, around 1450 - 1550 and to have geographically expanded across the entire planet, by about 1900.
• Capitalism is a system based on competition between free producers using free labor with free commodities, 'free' meaning its available for sale and purchase on a market. Situations in countries that deviate from this definition, such as the "communist" or "socialist" countries, and "Third countries", are not yet capitalist. World-systems analysis argues that capitalism, as a historical social system, has always integrated a variety of labor forms within a functioning division of labor (world-economy). Countries do not have economies, but are part of the world-economy. Far from being separate societies or worlds, the world-economy manifests a tripartite division of labor with core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral zones. In core zones businesses, with the support of states they operate within, monopolize the most profitable activities of the division of labor. In recognizing a tripartite pattern, world-systems analysis criticized dependency theory with its bimodal system of only cores and peripheries. There are many ways to attribute a specific country to the core, semi-periphery, or periphery. Using an empirically-based sharp formal definition of "domination" in a two-country relationship, Piana in 2004 defined the "core" as made up of "free countries" dominating others without being dominated, the "semi-periphery" as the countries which are dominated (usually—but not necessarily—by core countries) while at the same time they dominate others (usually in the periphery)and "periphery" as the countries which are dominated. Based on 1998 data, the full list of countries in the three regions—together with a discussion of methodology—can be found here.
• The late 18th and early 19th centuries marked a great turning point in the development of capitalism in that capitalists achieved state-societal power in the key states which furthered the industrial revolution marking the rise of capitalism. World-systems analysis contends that capitalism as a historical system formed earlier, that countries do not "develop" in stages, but rather the system does, and these events have a different meaning as a phase in the development of historical capitalism; namely the emergence of the three ideologies of the national developmental mythology (the idea that countries can develop through stages if they pursue the right set of policies): conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism.
• Human history is progressive and inevitably so. World-systems analysts, along with anthropologists, argue that the historical evidence suggests the contrary, that human societies have become increasingly unequal. The reason for the belief otherwise is precisely that modern social science emerged in the core zones, which contain about 20% of the modern world-system's population but controls about 80% of its wealth, which has expanded as inequality and power polarization has increased as a trend of the system.
• Science is the search for rules which summarize most succinctly why everything is the way it is and how things happen. Wallerstein writes: World-systems analysis is a call for the construction of a historical social science that feels comfortable with the uncertainties of transition, that contributes to the transformation of the world by illuminating the choices without appealing to the crutch belief in the inevitable triumph of good. World-systems analysis is a call to open the shutters that prevent us from exploring many areas of the real world. World-systems analysis is not a paradigm of historical social science. It is a call for a debate about the paradigm.

[編輯] Developments of Wallerstein's approach

Sobocinski <ref>An article by Sobocinski (pages 8-9)</ref> noted that "points to the relevance of even the simplest indicators - per capita GDP - to identify core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral countries, and notes that, as the areas "external" to the world system have disappeared over time, so also has there been a decrease in the percentage of the world's population that exists in peripheral countries, as defined in traditional developmental terms. Sobocinski's approach favors degree of proletarianization (described in Wallerstein's "Historical Capitalism") as an indicator of a country's status rather than degree of domination (as described above). Sobocinski indicates that economic trends seem to point to semi-peripheral status for the vast majority of the world's population, and the importance of internal inequalities (and internal colonialism) within such countries as a predominant concern over the near future, to likely be followed by the emergence of international class-based conflict on a global scale (rather than merely within selected nations and regions) as (per-capita) wealth inequalities between nations continue to decrease. Note that this sort of analysis is one of convenience, due to the ease of using data at the state level, although Wallerstein has pointed out that peripheral areas are not to be confused with peripheral states. Thus, one of the modern trends would seem to be the decline in peripheral states, in favor of a reemergence of peripheral areas within states - a kind of neo-"internal colonialism."

Originally Wallerstein distinguished two types of world-systems: "world-economies", systems of polities integrated within a single economy, and "World-Empires" where a single polity dominated and integrated an economy.

[編輯] New Developments of the World System Analysis

[編輯] Abu Lughod's version

Janet Abu Lughod argues that a pre-modern World System extensive across Eurasia existed in the 13th Century prior to the formation of the modern world-system identified by Wallerstein. Janet Abu Lughod contends that the Mongol Empire played an important role in stitching together the Chinese, Indian, Muslim and European regions in the 13th century, before the rise of the modern world system.<ref>Abu-Lugod, Janet (1989), "Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350"</ref> In debates, Wallerstein contends that her system was not a "world-system" because it did not entail integrated production networks, but was instead a vast trading network.

[編輯] Other contributions

Andre Gunder Frank goes even further and claims that a global-scale world system that includes Asia, Europe and Africa has existed since the 4th millennium BCE.<ref>Andrey Korotayev et al. go even further than Frank and date the beginning of the World System formation to the 10th millennium BCE, connecting it with the start of the Neolithic Revolution in the Middle East - see: Korotayev A., Malkov A., Khaltourina D. (2006). Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth. Moscow: KomKniga. ISBN 5-484-00414-4</ref> The center of this system was in Asia, specifically China.

Europe only prospered when Asian economy was in its contracting phase of long-term economic cycle and Europe had access to virtually free silver and gold from the Americas. There was no European miracle, Europe simply had geographical advantage in the discovery of Americas. This contracting phase is now coming to an end and the center is moving back to Asia. In a joint critique, Wallerstein, Arrighi, and Samin attacked the empirical data of this argument.

Archaeologically too the idea of a World System was extended to the Late Chalcolithic-Early Bronze Age, looking at the period of dominance of ancient Uruk, within the system that stretched from Egypt to the Indus.

These debates have seen a split in the identification of world-systems analysis and "world systems theory."

An important contribution to the study of the history of the World System was produced by Christopher Chase-Dunn and Tom Hall who discovered a significant synchrony in the urban dynamics of the western and eastern parts of Afroeurasia starting from the 1st millennium BCE (Chase-Dunn, C., and T. Hall. Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1997). The possible mechanisms of this synchrony were analyzed by Peter Turchin and Tom Hall (Turchin, Peter and Thomas D. Hall. 2003. Spatial Synchrony among and within World-Systems: Insights from Theoretical Ecology. Journal of World-Systems Research 9:37-66).

Modern applications of the theory have sought to incorporate the changing relations between the First World and the Second World with the collapse of the Soviet Union, describing attempts by the United States and Europe to "colonize" or "absorb" the Newly Indepenent States of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe into the New World Order. David Lempert's description of "Pepsi-stroika" builds on the "Coca-colonization" theme. Michael Burawoy has also focused on these transformations.

Looking at World Systems Theory (as distinct from world-systems analysis) from this perspective demonstrates similarity to the concept of the Oecumene, used by cultural historians like William McNeill. Historically World Systems Theory have been very useful as an antidote to the exceptionalism of Globalisation Theorists who argue that the current system is wholly without precedent in world history.<ref>An overview of current world systems theory debates is to be found, among others, in the volume: Globalization. Critical Perspectives. Editors: Gernot Kohler and Emilio José Chaves. Nova Science Publishers, Hauppauge, New York, 2003, with key-note contributions by Samir Amin, Patrick Bond, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein.</ref>

[編輯] The question of cycles

World systems theory has become part and parcel of the debate in major international peer-reviewed journals in the social sciences. For one, the entire notion of business cycles fascinates the profession. Without question, the notion of business cycles and war cycles dominates the debate about the time-series trajectory of the world system.

Although many contemporary economists treat the legacy of Nikolai Kondratiev with utter contempt, several major figures of economics of the 20th Century, among them Economic Nobel Prizewinners, were deeply impressed by Nicolai Kondratiev's research, which forms the starting point of the world systems theory notion of long cycles. It suffices to mention here not just Joseph Alois Schumpeter and also in a way Simon Kuznets, but Ragnar Frisch; Gottfried Haberler; Alvin H. Hansen; Walt Rostow; and Jan Tinbergen. The revival of Kondratiev research in the 1960s and beyond is linked to the simulation efforts of Jay Forrester at the MIT in the context of his world modeling for the Club of Rome. IIASA developed a highly sophisticated debate on the issue, centered mainly on the works of the physicist Cesare Marchetti and the Portuguese systems scientist Tessaleno Devezas. Devezas' research is particularly noteworthy here, because it combines sociological insights into values and generations with the mathematics of cyclical swings in economics and demography. Forrester reproduced a 50-year pattern for the US-economy, based on his System Dynamics National Model (NM-model) which is based on 15 sectors. Marchetti moved the debate away from price series to physical quantities, including production and energy consumption. Unfortunately, as sophisticated and statistically satisfying as this IIASA debate might sound, it has been rather overlooked by both the mostly Marxist and world system supporters of Kondratiev waves and by their economist detractors.

Early on, the United States Central Intelligence Agency commissioned a research paper by Ehud Levy-Pascal in the 1970s on Kondratiev cycles, and it was published in 1976. The Swiss world system sociologist Volker Bornschier also carried out quantitative sociological surveys of Kondratiev type of waves. In addition, a decisive breakthrough in the entire debate was the Ph. dissertation by Joshua Goldstein at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under supervision of Hayward Alker Jr., which was published in 1988. NATO's interest in the entire question has an obvious background - long cycle theory allows long-term predictions that are important for military and political contingency planning. Finally yet importantly, Kondratiev's native Russia fully rehabilitated one of her greatest social scientists of all times and now devotes a state research institute to scientific investigation in his memory.

Kondratiev downswings were always particularly severe in the Russian periphery of the world system, and the vicissitudes of reform and the re-centralization of government are closely linked to the Kondratiev cycle. The cyclical swings in the periphery are by far more pronounced than in the center and the depressions more severe. The level of inequality is historically higher in the periphery than in the center, but inequality also increases in the centers. Such comparisons clearly suggest three tendencies:

a) first, a faster growth in the peripheries during the beginning B-phase of the Kondratiev cycle

b) a more severe depression in the peripheries than in the center

c) a belated recovery in the periphery

The very logic of industrial processes and basic innovations, as well as the societal models, connected with them, would suggest building cyclical fluctuations into more general theories of development (Amin, 1997). Blast furnaces and other important components of the industrial process, too, have a certain life cycle, comparable with the Juglar cycles and Kuznets cycle, just as technical innovations are scattered in a non-random fashion along time, coinciding with the Kondratiev cycle (Bornschier, 1988 and 1995; for a very comprehensive summary Scandella, 1998). There are short term instabilities of 3 to 5 years duration (Kitchin cycles), 8-11 years duration (Juglar cycles), 18-22 years duration (Kuznets waves), and longer, 40-60 year Kondratiev waves. The following dating scheme, taken here from Tausch/Ghymers, 2006 could be suggested in the light of the Schumpeterian theory tradition (Scandella, 1998). Global capitalism since 1740 had the following Kuznets cycles (calculations based on the untransformed rates of global industrial production growth, 1740 - 2004), based on polynomial expressions of the sixth order:

1741-1756; R^2 = 23.5 %

1756-1774; R^2 = 36.1 %

1774-1793; R^2 = 34.8 %

1793-1812; R^2 = 39.7 %

1812-1832; R^2 = 16.4 %

1832-1862; R^2 = 25.7 %

1862-1885; R^2 = 36.3 %

1885-1908; R^2 = 56.2 %

1908-1932; R^2 = 44.2 %

1932-1958; R^2 = 19.1 %

1958-1975; R^2 = 60.9 %

1975-1992; R^2 = 75.8 %

The period between 1756 and 1832 is then the first Kondratiev cycle of the industrial age, the period between 1832 and 1885 as the second Kondratiev cycle, the period between 1885 and 1932 as the third Kondratiev cycle, and the period between 1932 and 1975 as the fourth Kondratiev cycle. Therefore, according to this logic, we are now in the fifth Kondratiev cycle of the industrial age; with one Kuznets cycle after the depression of the mid-1970s already well behind us, and the second Kuznets cycle since 1992 pointing in a downward direction.

For Volker Bornschier, there are the following phases in the K-cycle:

• Upswing
• Prosperity
• Prosperity-recession
• Crisis
• Temporary recovery
• Depression

Tests, provided by Tausch/Ghymers show that the Bornschier dating scheme much better corresponds to the structure of world production data than the alternative, proposed by Goldstein. This scheme is in line with the dating scheme proposed by Joshua Goldstein, Phil O'Hara, and Ernest Mandel, among many others.

The question of war cycles has received enormous international attention. Joshua Goldstein was led to the conclusion that the capitalist world systems tends continuously towards wars and violent conflicts. The international system is characterized according to him by

global war -> world hegemony of the dominant power -> de-legitimization of the international order -> de-concentration of the global system -> global war et cetera

The duration of these phases of the international order is approximately one Kondratieff cycle, so the unit of time of the international system can be symbolized by the expression 1K.

At a time of major shifts in world politics and economics, it is no wonder that systematic studies in the evolution of the international order have gained ground. Goldstein's quantitative approach (1988 ff.) concentrated on the major power confrontations as the `watershed' in international relations. Ample empirical evidence supports both Arrighi's and Goldstein's theories. Each world political cycle up to now corresponded to a `W'-pattern of untransformed annual battle fatalities from major power wars in thousands. The war cycle 1495-1648 is a polynomial expression of the 6th order; R^2 is 91.7%; 1649-1816 yields an R^2 of 33.6%; while a polynomial expression of the 6th order explains 50.1% of war intensity 1817-1945. The x-axis in our graph is the number of years after the end of the major power wars, i.e. 1648, 1816, and 1945. The same, deadly function explains 49.5% of annual battle fatalities in thousands from 1946 to 1975 (Tausch, 2007).

Now, one of the most intriguing features of contemporary capitalism seems to be the fact that vigorous upswings need to be supported by a tightly organized new world political hegemonic order, while the strength of the downswings and the severity of the depressions always are a function of the waning world political order. All real major depressions in the world system were hegemonic transition phases, and all these major crises thus had the character of what the present author calls a "Tsunami wave" of world politics that each time was also connected with terrible social upheavals, depressions and the onsets of major power wars, like the great crash of the early 1340s, which marked the beginning of the Genoese age (Arrighi) or Portuguese and Genoese age (Modelski), the crash of the 1560s, which marked the beginning of the Dutch era, the depression of the 1750s and 1760s, which marked the beginning of the British era, and the Great Depression in the 1930s, which was the terminal crisis of British world capitalist dominance (Arrighi, 1995).

By re-analyzing latest conflict data (great power battle fatalities from all wars, Goldstein, 1988 and COW/PRIO, 2005, from 1495 to 2002 and as yet unpublished UNIDO data about the growth of world industrial production 1740 - 2004) it was shown in Tausch/Ghymers that the long Kuznets and Kondratiev swings and cycles of capitalist world development that play such an important role in the analysis of global war since 1495 have indeed not ended after the end of Communism, and that instability, and not stability, characterize the world economy, and that there is an indented "W" shaped pattern of global conflict since 1495 that did not end with the end of the Cold War. World hegemonies that characterize the workings of world capitalism arise and they end. As it is well known in world system research, especially from the works of Arrighi and Silver, there are signal crises of world capitalism (the usual Kondratiev depressions), and there are terminal crises of the world system, when hegemonies end. Peaceful transitions from one hegemony to the other are among the most intricate questions of peace research and peace policy of our time.

[編輯] Regaining a Schumpeterian perspective

Authors like Joseph Alois Schumpeter, and later world system and dependency writers like Samir Amin, Volker Bornschier, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Raul Prebisch, and Osvaldo Sunkel were always aware of the crises, cyclical imbalances, regional shifts, and of the rise and decline of entire regions and even continents in the process of capitalist development.

Like many other development theorists of the first generation of development economists after the Second World War, whose stars began to rise long after Schumpeter in the post-war period, and who all greatly influenced “dependency theory” in the world periphery, like Kurt Mandelbaum, Paul Narcyz Rosenstein-Rodan, and Hans Wolfgang Singer, capitalism for Schumpeter never was a smooth equilibrium process, whose end result is crisis-free growth, full employment, environmental sustainability and an end to social exclusion.

Quantitative world systems debate has to mention the name of the Swiss sociologist Volker Bornschier, who throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and beyond, has been a critical voice on the long-run detrimental effects of transnational penetration on the host countries in world capitalism, dynamizing the host countries of transnational foreign investment only in the short run, but leading towards inequality and stagnation in the long run, thus enormously enriching earlier work on dependency theories, pioneered by Peter Heintz and the Latin American "dependency theory school". His theoretical and empirical developments made "dependency theory" truly global and linked it up to the evolving world system school, and by his networking and collaboration –especially with Christopher Chase Dunn – firmly entrenched the "quantitative approach" in the world system school. His later work, related to the long cyclical fluctuations in the world economy, has shown that instability is also an overwhelming element in the historical evolution of capitalism, and that the world would need a new social contract similar in its encompassing nature to the one that shaped the world after the Great Depression in the 1930s. Bornschier put high hopes into the European Union as an alternative, more "social" pole in the world economy.

Conventional wisdom of the "Washington Consensus" has it that it is always the periphery or semi-periphery country that got it all wrong during a crisis, like in East Asia, Russia or recently in Turkey and that a good combination of economic freedom, privatization, tight monetary policies and above all private foreign direct investment will "fix" it, once the forces of the market are properly at work (see Tausch and Ghymers, 2006).

The "Washington Consensus" represents the following policy priorities:

1. Fiscal discipline: a primary budget surplus of several percent of GDP
2. Public expenditure priorities: defined as re-directions of public expenditures towards fields with high economic returns such as primary health and education
3. Tax reform: cutting marginal tax rates
4. Financial liberalization: moderately positive real interest rates and the abolition of preferential interest rates (such as for developmentally useful or socially demanded projects)
5. Exchange rates: unified and competitive
6. Trade liberalization: abolishing quotas (replacing them by tariffs) and reducing tariffs to a uniform low level within three to ten years.
7. Foreign direct investment: equal treatment with domestic firms. The World Bank calls this the elimination of barriers. This principle is also enshrined in the WTO treaties
8. Privatization
9. Deregulation: abolishing regulations aiming at achieving developmental or social aims
10. Property rights: must be guaranteed

The counter-position, advanced by globalization critics, environmentalists, liberation theologians of all denominations, and - most recently - dissidents from the once homogeneous neo-liberal camp would hold that unfettered globalization increases the social gaps between rich and poor both within countries as well as on a global scale. Most of the adherents of this camp would share the view proposed by Giovanni Andrea Cornia and associates that income distribution in the world system has worsened during the period of globalization. Indeed, the challenge by dependency theory to the neo-classical consensus is a real one – especially in a time of growing stagnation in the centers and social polarization in many countries of the periphery.

It has been established fairly well enough that there is a continuing phenomenon of world poverty. However, what beyond that? Is globalization really the cause of world poverty? Or is rather the absence of globalization and foreign investment to blame for the continued misery in countries, say, like Myanmar, while outward-looking policies dramatically increased the lot of wide strata of the population in countries like China, Thailand and India over the last decades?

This growing international controversy on globalization and social inequality can be neatly portioned in two camps – scholars maintaining that world inequality is increasing during globalization, and scholars, maintaining that world inequality is decreasing over time during globalization. Much of the confusion rests on the fact that most globalization - > increasing inequality studies deal with world incomes measured at exchange rates, while world income distribution and world social equity, measured in purchasing power parities or “hard” basic human needs indicators, tended to become more egalitarian over recent decades.

Especially the thorough methodological criticism voiced by the very well known US economist James K. Galbraith should be mentioned here. Galbraith's freely available UTIP (‘University of Texas Inequality Project’) global inequality data base documents wage inequality (inequality of wages in 21 economic sectors) for over 70 countries on a time series base from 1960 onwards. This massive research project then estimates the econometric relationships between these inequality data and the often-deficient World Bank data series and projects GINI coefficients of estimated income inequality over time since 1960 in 70 countries that concentrate the large majority of world population within their borders. Galbraith and his team could show that based on such data, global inequality is increasing under globalization.

For the globalization -> poverty reduction school to be maintained, it must be shown that several indicators of globalization, and not just the indicator “share of foreign trade by GDP”, are significantly and systematically linked to a series of indicators of national and social well-being, including income redistribution, democracy, and sustainable development, irrespective of the development level achieved.

Finally, a truly massive cross-national research literature exists whose results are often diametrically opposed to one another, with dependency scholars claiming that dependency has adverse affects on the ‘human condition’ (economic growth, income equality, human well-being, gender and ecological relationships), while neo-liberal scholars claiming the opposite. In a cautious ballance sheet of the debate up to now, Tausch (2003) proposed the determination of 14 indicators of development in 109 countries with complete data.

The determinants of world development were chosen to be the following:

•  % population, aged >65y, 1998
•  % women in government, ministerial level
• (I-S)/GDP (calculated from UNDP; investments minus savings per GDP)
• economic freedom (Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal website for economic freedom, 2000)
• EU-membership
• Islamic conference membership (OIC website)
• ln (GDP PPP pc)^2 (natural log GDP per capita in real purchasing power parities)
• ln(GDP PPP pc) (natural log GDP per capita in real purchasing power parities)
• military expenditure as % of GDP
• MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD)
• public education expenditure per GDP
• unequal exchange (calculated from UNDP, concept: ERDI; exchange rate deviation index)

The dependent variables were:

•  % people not expected to survive age 60
• CO2 emissions per capita
• development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) since 1975 (calculated from UNDP)
• ESI-Index (Yale/Columbia environment sustainability index project website)
• Factor Social Development (calculated from 35 UNDP social indicators, SPSS factor analysis)
• female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate
• female share in total life years (calculated from UNDP - share of female life expectancy in the sum of male and female life expectancy)
• GDP output per kg energy use ("eco-social market economy")
• GDP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98
• human development index
• life expectancy, 1995-2000
• Political rights violations (Freedom House, 2000)
• share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%
• unemployment (UN social indicators website)

The empirical record, presented speaks a clear language in favor of Islamic democracy and against those in the West that attempt to treat Islamic cultural heritage as a general development burden. It should be also clear that a reliance on the “Washington Consensus” alone will not “fix” the performance of countries beyond a better and more predictable “development stability”. The most consistent consequence of the “dependency” analysis of this essay is the realization that a reliance on foreign capital in the short term might bring about positive consequences for employment – especially female employment – but that the long-term negative consequences of dependence in the social sphere, but also for sustainable development, outweigh the immediate, positive effects. The three-fold empirical understanding of the process of globalization – reliance on foreign savings, MNC penetration and unequal exchange, - shows how different aspects of dependency negatively affect development performance. The integration of the countries of the periphery into larger currency blocs – quite contrary to what the “Washington Consensus” has to say about “competitive currencies” - will be one of the most important tasks for international development strategies for years to come.

[編輯] Literature (Selection)

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• Sunkel O. (1973), ‘El subdesarrollo latinoamericano y la teoria del desarrollo’ Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 6a edicion.
• Sunkel O. (1978a), 'The Development of Development Thinking' in 'Transnational Capitalism and National Development. New Perspectives on Dependence' (Villamil J.J. (Ed.)), pp. 19 - 30, Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press.
• Sunkel O. (1978b), 'Transnationalization and it’s National Consequences' in 'Transnational Capitalism and National Development. New Perspectives on Dependence' (Villamil J.J. (Ed.)), pp. 67 - 94, Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press.
• Sunkel O. (1980), ‘Transnacionalizacion y dependencia‘ Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica del Instituto de Cooperacion Iberoamericana.
• Sunkel O. (1984), ‘Capitalismo transnacional y desintegracion nacional en America Latina’ Buenos Aires, Rep. Argentina : Ediciones Nueva Vision.
• Sunkel O. (1990), ‘Dimension ambiental en la planificacion del desarrollo. English The environmental dimension in development planning ‘ 1st ed. Santiago, Chile : United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
• Sunkel O. (1991), ‘El Desarrollo desde dentro: un enfoque neoestructuralista para la America Latina’ 1. ed. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica.
• Sunkel O. (1994), ‘Rebuilding capitalism: alternative roads after socialism and dirigisme’ Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press
• Tausch A. (1993, with Fred Prager as co-author), 'Towards a Socio - Liberal Theory of World Development' Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press.
• Tausch A. (2003), "Social cohesion, sustainable development and Turkey's accession to the European Union: implications from a global model" Alternatives. Turkish Journal of International Relations, 2(1), 1 - 41.
• Tausch A. (2007), 'Global terrorism and world political cycles' History and mathematics (Moscow), special issue, 1(1), 99 - 126.
• Tausch A. and Christian Ghymers (2006), 'From the “Washington” towards a “Vienna Consensus”? A quantitative analysis on globalization, development and global governance'.

[編輯] References

1.^ Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) the Modern World-System, New York, Academic Press, pp. 347-57.

2.^ An article by Sobocinski (pages 8-9)

3.^ Abu-Lugod, Janet (1989), "Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350"

4.^ Andrey Korotayev et al. go even further than Frank and date the beginning of the World System formation to the 10th millennium BCE, connecting it with the start of the Neolithic Revolution in the Middle East - see: Korotayev A., Malkov A., Khaltourina D. (2006). Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth. Moscow: KomKniga. ISBN 5-484-00414-4

5.^ An overview of current world systems theory debates is to be found, among others, in the volume: Globalization. Critical Perspectives. Editors: Gernot Kohler and Emilio José Chaves. Nova Science Publishers, Hauppauge, New York, 2003, with key-note contributions by Samir Amin, Patrick Bond, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein.

[編輯] See also

• Sociocybernetics
• General systems theory
• Social cycle theory
• Systems philosophy
• Systems thinking
• War cycles
• List of cycles

[編輯] External links

• Institute for Research on World-Systems
• Journal of World-Systems Research
• World-Systems Archive
• Working Papers in the World Systems Archive
• World-Systems Archive Books
• World-Systems Electronic Seminars
• Preface to ReOrient by Andre Gunder Frank
• Andre Gunder Frank resources
• The Modern World-System by Immanuel Wallerstein
• Immanuel Wallerstein resources
• The African Crisis - World Systemic and Regional Aspects by Giovanni Arrighi
• The Rise of East Asia in World Historical Perspective by Giovanni Arrighi
• Neo-marxist Political Economy
• Resilience, Panarchy, and World-Systems Analysis
• A Dynamic Map of the World Cities' Growth
• Revista Entelequia

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(亞太所汪治邦)

[編輯] 新區域主義

新區域主義無論在數量、範圍、差異性都與1960 年代的區域主義浪潮有極大的不同。在第一波區域主義浪潮近尾聲時，Joseph Nye 就指出了兩個層級的區域活動：一個是小的經濟組織涉入正式的經濟整合當中﹔另一個是大的區域政治組織依然關切衝突控制的問題，兩者如今同時站在世界舞台上52。新區域主義在機制的型態上有相當大的變化，這也是新區域主義的顯著特徵。許多是正式的，但也有許多是非正式的，同時刻意規避官僚化、機制化的結構。另外，許多區域產生了地區意識與認同，雖然這類的認同要變成區域合作的進程還不是那麼容易。

在1960 末-1970 初，界定區域和區域主義引起了相當多的學術討論，但是仍缺乏清楚的結論。區域主義通常被用來分析社會凝聚力（共同繼承的民族、族群、語言、宗教、文化、歷史、意識等）、經濟凝聚力（貿易模式、經濟執行程度）、政治凝聚力（體制的型態、意識型態）以及組織的凝聚力（正式區域機構的存在）等等的程度。特別是關注區域互賴的想法。 關於互賴的一般性想法：在一區域內的國家，通常認為彼此是在一艘區域的船上，在經濟、策略上相互依賴，因此必須捐棄民族自大意識，發明出一種合作的新形式，在學術上或政治上，多半認為區域主義本質上是一件好事。

區域主義定義廣泛，所以也包含了多樣的現象。把區域主義的概念區分為五個不同的範疇，比起用一個寬廣的、單一的、無所不包的概念有用的多。這五個範圍的區域主義，僅僅是分析上的區別，他們可能在理論上或實踐上彼此相關：區域化﹔區域意識與認同﹔區域內國家間的合作﹔促進以國家為主體的區域整合﹔區域內聚力。也有學者將區域主義劃分為國家性的、跨國性的、國際性的、以及次區域性的。

「區域」（region）和「區域主義」（regionalism）都是很模糊的名詞。關於定義和範圍爭議頗多，且少有共識。其中一個爭論重點是，區域是否意含著地理上的接近性。

資料來源:楊華妙撰 區域化與區域主義：中國大陸區域經濟整合模式之比較研究 國立中山大學

誠如Edward D. Mansfield 與Helen V. Milner 在1999 年的International Organization 期刊中所發表的回顧文章（review article）----“The New Wave ofRegionalism”----中所言，區域主義可以說是一個頗為模糊的概念。區域主義的出現與1950 至1960 年代針對經濟整合所從事之區域集團化（regional grouping）與區域計畫（scheme）有關。在此一時期中，「數目有限的國家」（limited numbers of states）因為具有地理上的接近特性（geographical proximity）而開始經營彼此的經濟互賴關係；不過，區域主義的發展其實遠超過此種地理上與經濟上的共同關注。諸如歷史、政治、文化、意識型態以及種族上的同質性或類似特性，區域內的國家間之互動程度開始頻繁，為了要解決國與國之間的共同問題，國家間開始有了更為多元的互動。這種型態的互動

根據Fiona Bulter 引述A. Hurrel 的觀點，主要可分為下列幾個內涵： 1.強調逐漸成長之非正式聯繫與交易過程的區域主義：例如，台商在中國大陸與東南亞地區的投資所形成的特殊經濟區，或者是日本在海外所建立的投資與產業網絡等。 2.強調政治、歷史、地理環境等共同認知的區域意識（regionalawareness）或認同：例如，新加坡前總理李光耀所強調的「亞洲價值」（Asian Values）與Samuel P. Huntington 在The Clash of Civilizationsand the Remaking of World Order 一書中所探討的各種「文明(civilization)。 3.強調正式合作關係的「區域內跨國合作」（regional interstate cooperation）：例如，亞太經合會（Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,APEC）等跨國經濟合作機制的建立。 4.強調經濟面向的「由國家推動之經濟整合」：例如，早期由歐洲共同市場（European Common Market）與東協所推動的經濟整合計畫--「東協自由貿易區」（ASEAN Free Trade Area,AFTA）等等。 5.整合上述四個過程的「區域凝聚」（regional cohesion）：例如，歐盟的全面性政治統合過程。

不過，隨著國際事務的複雜性日益提高，區域主義的內涵亦開始進行演化，到了1980 年代以後，新型態的區域主義，透過相對複雜的經濟互賴與貿易合作關係呈現出更為特殊的國際合作型態。

此種型態，也就是所謂的「新區域主義」（new regionalism），在晚近引起了學界的諸多關注。新區域主義一詞的出現，最早可追溯到Norman D. Palmer 的著作New Regionalism in Asia and Pacific，Palmer 在該書中主要比較了1950 至1960年代的區域主義與今日的區域主義間的差異，並將重點置於亞洲與太平洋地區的實踐。接續，在1990 年代之後開始陸續出現了諸多針對新區域主義進行學理與實務探討的文獻（其中，以2000 年以後最為興盛），譬如Jaime De Melo 與Arvind Panagariya 從相對宏觀的視野探討了晚近區域整合過程中所出現的諸多新面向；Stefan A.Schirm 則是將新區域主義置於全球化的脈絡中，並進一步探討全球市場、國內政治以及區域合作等不同分析層次的關係；而Shaun Breslin 等人則是專注在新區域主義於全球經濟中之理論發展與個案探討進行分析；Finn Laursen等學者則是從理論的觀點對區域整合運動進行比較；在學理上，Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw 等人亦針對新區域主義的發展進行更為細緻的回顧，其探討的焦點除了主流國際關係理論的分析外，亦包括諸如英國學派、世界秩序途徑等源自於歐洲地區的學理觀點。除了上述之概念層次的探討外，在各個區域的實際操作上亦不乏熱烈討論，譬如Michael Keating 從地域與政治變遷的觀點探討西歐地區的新區域主義發展；而Sueo Sudo 則是從新區域主義的角度探討了日本與東南亞國家間的關係；無獨尤偶地，Tran Van Hoa 與Charles Harvie 以及Kanishka Jayashriya 等人亦在近期對亞洲或亞太地區在全球化的衝擊下如何因應或如何治理等問題，提出了新區域主義式的分析。上述文獻的相繼出現為新區域主義知識體系的建立，提供了相當充沛的新穎論點。儘管如此，針對新區域主義的研究最為關鍵的研究成果，首推聯合國大學（United Nations University, UNU）與世界發展經濟學研究中心（World Institute of Development Economics Research, WIDER）所資助的新區域主義研究計畫，此一計畫結束後由Björn Hettne、András Inotai 與Osvaldo Sunkel 等學者彙編成五本專書，從而為嶄新的新區域主義研究途徑奠下了更具系統化的學理基礎。

進一步來說，我們亦可以從新區域主義所呈現的三個特徵來加以區別兩者：新區域主義強調(1)「開放性區域主義」（open regionalism）：開放性區域主義係相對於過去的保護性質之區域主義的內涵。此一特質強調區域內進行經濟整合與建立自由貿易區的同時，亦將透過積極提升全球貿易自由化之進程，跨大對外聯結。此一特質，其實正是新區域主義中為了要建立區域化過程與全球化進程間的重要聯繫橋樑；(2)「南-北區域主義」（South-North regionalism）：南-北區域主義指的是在現今的許多區域協定中，大多包涵了開發中國家以及以開發國家之特色。此種發展與早期的經濟集團均屬於類似的經濟層級有極大的差異，例如，新加坡的GNP 是印尼的25 倍，但他們共屬於東協自由貿易區中；以及(3)多重區域主義（multiple regionalism）：多重區域主義的特色即在強調國家的多重成員特性，主要原因在於各國希望透過多元參與的貿易協定來分散風險。例如，東協國家不但是東協的成員，亦為亞太經合會或東協區域論壇（ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF）的成員。事實上，上述新區域主義的這三個特徵，正為1990 年代以後的區域合作以及區域內之跨國合作下了最好的註腳，特別是「多重區域主義」的特徵，更能彰顯出亞太地區之區域主義的獨特發展模式。

資料來源:楊昊 新區域主義與安全治理：東協安全擴溢網絡在亞太地區的實踐與挑戰 國立中正大學

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[編輯] 霸權穩定理論

霸權穩定概念最初由經濟學家Charles P. Kindleberger所提出，他主要是在解釋國際經濟環境中，具有主宰地位的經濟霸權國對於穩定國際經濟秩序與自由經濟市場的重要性。經濟霸權國不僅是一個具有支配性能力與地位的經濟強權，且有意願擔負維護國際財政與貿易制度，以建構一套國際經濟的遊戲規則，提供作為各國遵循的行為規範，使得國際經濟秩序得以維持穩定。因此，霸權穩定理論從歷史上出現過數個超強主導的國際自由經濟秩序中，觀察到現代國際經濟制度的運作與維持，必須透過霸權國的安排與維護，才能夠使得自由經濟制度長期有效運作。 霸權穩定理論提供學者分析國際政治經濟有重要貢獻，Robert Keohane 使用霸權穩定理論指稱國際自由體系與霸權經濟之間的關係，他認為「由一個國家主宰的霸權結構，非有益於強大國際體系的發展，這個體系的運作規則必較明確，並且有高度的遵守」國際規範。因此，Robert Gilpin認為一個位居霸權地位的自由經濟國家的存在，是國際市場經濟持續發展的必要條件。換言之，霸權國所領導的國際政治經濟架構是維繫世界經濟與國際秩序的主要支柱，其原因則是由於霸權國有能力和意願在維繫國際秩序上，提供公共財（public goods）和確保國際政治環境的穩定，例如平穩的國際貨幣體系和國際安全秩序等。 霸權穩定理論的另外一面就是指出霸權的式微將可能導致其主導的國際秩序瓦解，但是學者的研究發現如果霸權國能夠同時建構國際或區域合作建制，則有可能在霸權國力相對減弱時，國際或區域合作建制仍然能夠繼續提供穩定國際或區域環境。因此，Keohane另外提出了「霸權合作」（hegemonic cooperation）概念，目的在指出霸權國透過國際建制（international regime），整合相關國家的多邊國際合作，建構議題的規範與程序，以減少互動成本並降低不確定性，美國在戰後所建構之國際經濟層面的國際建制，如國際金融、貿易、能源等領域，顯現霸權與合作在某些議題中是可以互補的。但是，霸權國選擇建立多邊的國際建制當然是基於本身利益的考量，如果建構國際或區域性建制的成效有限或是成本過高，且霸權國本身有足夠能力提供公共財或是維護安全，則霸權國將不會建立相關建制。 就國際和平與安全而言，霸權穩定理論也同樣可以提供類似的解釋。亦即透過霸權國在國際政治與秩序上的安排，確保與維繫國際與區域安全與和平，因此超強的存在有助於建構與維持國際與區域安全。超強在軍事、政治與經濟方面的主導性優勢地位，一方面使得區域強權國家不願直接向其挑戰，另一方面透過超強主導的安全體系，整合其他國家採取與超強合作政策，並建構相關國際組織與國際規範，維持國際與區域和平與安全。至於霸權合作概念在國際安全層面，則包括集體安全制度與防衛性聯盟等。兩次大戰之後的國際聯盟與聯合國，就是希望透過由主要強權國家所組成的理事會與安全理事會，以集體安全體制共同維護國際安全與和平，共同分擔維護國際安全的責任與義務。此外，霸權國與區域國家簽署的區域性防衛同盟，也是霸權希望透過區域性安排，確保區域安全與和平。 霸權穩定理論應用在國際安全的另一層面，是特別重視如何確保與維繫穩定與和平的現狀（status quo）。因為穩定與和平的現狀，最符合既得利益的強權國家，特別是居於霸權地位的國家，穩定與和平的現狀不僅代表霸權的威望，也代表著經濟利益的持續，並可提高次級強權國家挑戰權力結構的成本，畢竟霸權之所以有意願去創建並維繫國際經濟與政治秩序與體制，是因為自由經濟體系與和平的世界秩序，符合霸權國本身的利益。這也反映出聯合國安全體系的基本理念是「重和平、輕正義」，因為現狀的和平與穩定是最有利於霸權國及其他支持霸權體系強權國家的利益與生存。

霸權穩定理論與國際政治的現實主義理論有著密切的關係，但是兩者並非同義字。新現實主義強調國際社會的權力分配結構決定國際體系的秩序與穩定，因此，處於超強地位的霸權國將能夠依照其利益與偏好，建構其所屬意的國際秩序。這種過於重視結構性因素的霸權穩定理論，往往有可能忽略國家之間的交往，尤其是戰略互動（strategic interaction），也有可能改變某個國際性議題的政策產出。但是，在眾多影響國際與區域和平與安全的因素中，當然仍以結構性因素最為容易觀察，也較具有全面性的影響。

資料來源:楊永明。「美國亞太安全戰略之理論分析」。美歐季刊。1997年，冬季號。

歐研所 皇希

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[編輯] 權力平衡

權力平衡（英語：Balance of power），亦譯做「均勢」、「勢力均衡」，是古典現實主義與結構現實主義理論的核心概念之一。中國國際關係研究文獻中的「格局」概念與此相近。此一概念可以指一種強調國家間應彼此警惕、制約的政策主張。也可以指客觀存在的，國際體系間的權力對比態勢。究竟採何定義，端視文獻脈絡而定。

另外，由於權力的行使主體非僅限於國家，組織、機構、企業、政黨體系、家族中，也可能有權力平衡的現象。例如某種產品市場或某個國家的政黨體系中，也可以出現「權力平衡」。其參與者，如公司、自然人，也可以採取權力平衡的策略以獲取各種利益。

[編輯] 權力平衡作為制衡政策

權力平衡作為一個國家的外交政策主軸，可謂歷史悠久，此一政策可稱為「均勢原則」(A doctrine of equilibrium)。此一政策希望達成的目標是，使相互競爭的各方勢力處於一個相對穩定、彼此牽制的狀態，不使任何一方過於強大而打破均勢，破壞穩定，成為霸權 (hegemony)，主宰國際體系。這一原則也可以用在市場策略、政黨鬥爭、人際關係等等競爭環境中。

權力平衡可以說是一種古老的策略，不一定需要學理的闡述，而作為常識普遍存在。如英國哲學家休姆在其「權力平衡論」(Essay on the Balance of Power)所言，權力平衡是古今政治理論家與政治人物都耳熟能詳的。它的來源不過是自我保存的本能和人生經驗而已。

現代現實主義理論家，包括古典派與結構派，都認為國家傾向制衡(balance)任何過於強大的同儕。由於國際體處於無政府狀態，制衡是唯一防止國際社會淪於帝國霸權專斷主宰的理性出路。這一原則對於大國(列強)而言尤其真確。因為小國對國際政治影響較少，其選項比較無足輕重。

[編輯] 權力平衡作為客觀態勢

國際關係學者有時也把權力平衡理解為一種客觀態勢，即一種各國權力關係的較為穩定、持久的狀態。此一定義有時也被稱做「現狀」(status quo)。權力平衡狀態可能包括「一超多強」、「兩極」、「多極」等情形。也可能指一個區域內的權力關係現狀，如「臺海權力平衡」、「東歐權力平衡」等等。

結構現實主義創始人華爾志(K. Waltz)指出，國際體系有一種自動回復權力平衡的規律。從羅馬帝國瓦解迄今，任何企圖破壞總體平衡的個別國家的企圖，如拿破崙、希特勒、日本帝國等，無一例外地引起其他國家群起制衡，使體系最終回歸平衡狀態。而美國若執意追求單極獨霸甚至「帝國」大業，也將被此一規律所阻。(可能有無數例外,如蒙古帝國和大英帝國)

(亞太所蔡承哲)

[編輯] 參考資料

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (McGraw-Hill, 1979).

Hedley Bull, Anarchial Society (United States of America: Macmillan Ltd, 1977).

John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security and the American Experience (United States of America: Harvard University Press, 2004).

Ernst B. Haas, "The balance of power: prescription, concept, or propaganda", World Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4, (1953), pp. 442-477.

Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 2000).

陳志奇，中國近代外交史。臺北：南天出版社，1993年。

陳樂民，西方外交思想史。北京：中國社會科學出版社，1995年。

何茂春，中國外交通史。北京：中國社會科學出版社，1996年。

(亞太所蔡承哲)

[編輯] Hegemonic Stability Theory WIKI版

『亞太所 朱益賢』

Hegemonic Stability Theory postulates a number of rules for the maintenance and decline of international monetary and political systems. Its leading exponents are the political scientist Stephen D. Krasner and economic historian Charles P. Kindleberger. Owing to significant popularity and widespread diffusion there is significant internal differentiation of focus and fact within the field.

Charles Kindleberger, whose analysis of the 1929 depression is widely accepted as the precursor of the theory, states that for an international system of trade and finance to function smoothly there must be a hegemon. This is so because there is a collective action problem in that regulation and institutionalization of trade and finance is a public good, that is, it benefits the community. To solve the collective action problem, a hegemon takes the lead and is motivated to do so because of the benefit it gains; for example, the United States benefitted greatly as the reserve currency under the Bretton Woods system.

Kindleberger's theory stems from the historical experience of the United Kingdom. Its manufacturing production surpassed that of France in the 1850s, it took on the leading role as exporter of capital, and used British gunboats to force trade. The UK was a hegemon, and used this power to maintain the international economic system. In the 1930s however, the UK had lost its dominance and when the Great Depression hit, the system broke down because of the absence of a hegemon.

A Hegemon, according to Keohane<ref>Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony</ref>, is a state that possesses the following characteristics:

1. the ability to create and enforce international norms,
2. the will to do so,
3. decisive economic, technological, and military dominance.

A hegemon is now commonly referred to as a superpower, a term used to describe the United States. An important distinction between a period of hegemony and one of empire or imperialism, with the former willing to operate within its own framework of established order, while the latter is intent on unilateral domination.

[編輯] Criticism

Numerous critics have expressed concern about the theory.

First, it is not just the hegemon’s existence that maintains order, but also some recognition of the hierarchy of states by other actors in the international community. As Wyatt Walters argues, it was the Soviet threat that led the UK, France and Germany to take a secondary role to the U.S.; it was not just the presence of the United States.

Second, it has been argued that the absence of a hegemon during the interwar years was not responsible for the breakdown of the international economic system, instead, it was the harsh reparations imposed on Germany.

The existence of bipolarity (at least militarily) suggests two hegemon-like powers may be able to coexist and diffuse and destabilize each other.

Lastly, hegemons do not last very long due to internal decline, external decline and sometimes due to the shift of power within a state.

[編輯] Newer variations of the theory

Neorealists argue that the hegemon supports the system so long as it is in their interests. The system is created, shaped and maintained by coercion. The hegemon would begin to undermine the institution when it is not in their interests. With the decline of a hegemon, the system descends into instability.

Neoliberals argue that the hegemon provides public goods through institutions and works in the best interests of everybody. It is motivated by ‘enlightened self-interest’; the hegemon takes on the costs because it is good for all actors, thereby creating stability in the system, which is also in the interests of all actors. With the decline of the hegemon, institutions don't automatically die; instead, they take on a life of their own (see regime theory).

[編輯] Is the U.S. still a hegemon?

Hegemony demands power, which is defined by Susan Strange as the ability of one party to affect outcomes such that their preferences take precedence over the preferences of other parties. The question of whether the U.S. is still a hegemon is tied into whether or not it has lost power. Keohane sees power as tied into resources and production, and because US GDP is now lower relative to others, it implies a loss of power.

Although resources are an important determinant of power, they are not always determinative. For example, the German troops that conquered western Europe were actually fewer in number than their opponents. Susan Strange uses this logic to argue that the U.S. is still a hegemon.

One form of power that the U.S. possess is structural power. After the Exxon Valdez accident, the US passed a domestic law commanding any oil delivery ship to have unlimited liability insurance. Even though most oil shipping companies are located overseas, they nevertheless complied with the law because the US is world’s largest market for oil. This non coercive or attractive form of power is key to Keohane and Nye's concept of Soft Power.

In addition to structural power, the U.S. has many resources. It unilaterally helped Mexico in the Peso Crisis and unilaterally helped Russia with economic aid. The United States has also 'persuaded' many countries to embrace the free market; through institutions such as the IMF, it pushed Latin American nations to undertake economic programs that Washington believed was necessary (see Washington Consensus).

[編輯] References

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony

[編輯] External links

• Summaries of International Relations Theories

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[編輯] 相關國際文書

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[編輯] 著名的國政經學者

• Theodore Cohn
• Helen Milner
• Robert Putnam and his two-level game theory
• Peter A. Hall
• David A. Lake
• Susan Strange
• Geoffrey Garrett
• Jeffry Frieden
• Barry Eichengreen
• Ronald Rogowski
• Beth Simmons
• Francis Fukuyama
• Duncan Wood
• John Ruggie
• Gary Gereffi
• Peter B Evans
• Robert Bates
• Robert W. Cox
• Stephen Gill
• Stephen D. Krasner
• Robert Gilpin
• Immanuel Wallerstein
• Peter J. Katzenstein
• Jagdish Bhagwati
• Jonathan Nitzan
• Thomas Oatley
• Ngaire Woods
• Benjamin Cohen (professor)
• Matthew Watson
• Louis Pauly

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[編輯] 外部連結

• International Political Economy Network
• The Review of International Political Economy
• Adam Smith Institute 亞當斯密研究所